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ABSTRACT

This dissertation consists of three essays on quote stuffing, dealer provided
liquidity, and stub quoting. The first essay examines the impact that intense episodic
spikes in quoting activity (frequently referred to as “quote stuffing”) has on market
conditions. We find that quote stuffing is pervasive with several hundred events occurring
each trading day and that over 74% of US exchange traded securities experience at least
one episode during 2010. We find that during periods of intense quoting activity stocks
experience decreased liquidity, higher trading cost, and increased short term volatility.
In the second we examine the role of the NASDAQ market marker over time.
Specifically, we study the liquidity providing behavior of NASDAQ market markers in the
trading environment in 2010 compared to 2004. We examine the frequency with which
market makers are at the inside quote, the market and stock specific factors that influence
market maker participation, changes in the number of market makers over time, and the
relation between market maker participation and intraday bid-ask spread patterns. We
find that the role of NASDAQ market makers declines over time. In 2004, the percentage of
the trading day that market makers quote at the inside bid (ask) is 60% (62%) compared
to 2010 when NASDAQ dealers quote at the inside bid (ask) just 12% (11%). The number
of market makers declines. We also find evidence that the influence market makers have
on intraday variations in the bid-ask declines over time.
ii

Finally in the third essay, we examine the liquidity providing behavior of NASDAQ
market makers surrounding two periods of changing dealer obligation. The first period is
the relaxation of Rule 4613 in November of 2007 which required NASDAQ market makers
to place two-sided quotes that must be “reasonably related” to the current best bid and
offer. This rule change permitted NASDAQ market makers to post quotes far away from the
prevailing market (frequently referred to as a “Stub Quote”). The second is the Securities
and Exchange Commission ban on stub quoting in December 2010 which requires that
market makers quote within a predefined distance from market prices. We find evidence
in both the 2007 and 2010 rule change periods that placing restrictions on stub quoting
alters market makers liquidity providing behavior. Stub quote restrictions increase the
time that market makers quote at the NBBO. We also find evidence that stub quoting
restrictions increase the percent of daily volume executed by market makers. However, we
find little evidence that stub quoting rules impact the participation of market makers
during days with excessive volatility.
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ESSAY 1: QUOTE STUFFING

1.1 Introduction
Quote stuffing is a practice in which a large number of orders to buy or sell
securities are placed and then canceled almost immediately. These intense episodic spikes
in order submissions and cancelations have come under scrutiny from the media and
regulators. 1 Market participants criticize the practice stating that it creates a false sense of
the supply and demand for a stock. Sean Hendelman, chief executive officer at T3 Capital,
expressed his concern stating, “People are relying on the [stock quote data] and the data is
not real” (Lauricella and Stasburg, 2010, page A. 1). Others have likened the practice to an
auctioneer placing “plants” and “shills” in the audience in an attempt to manipulate prices
thru fake bidding (Elder, 2010). Are these concerns justified? How prevalent is quote
stuffing? Does quote stuffing adversely affect market conditions, and if so, to what degree?
This paper seeks to address these questions.
The practice of quote stuffing is often linked to high frequency trading (hereafter, HFT).
HFT garnered increased attention in the wake of the May 6, 2010 “flash crash” when the
Dow Jones Industrial Average collapsed 700 points in a few minutes. HFT is an investment
strategy where investors rapidly buy and sell securities thru the use of high speed
computer algorithms. Holding periods for securities bought and sold by high frequency
traders are typically very short, lasting just seconds or milliseconds. Further, high
frequency traders may move in and out of positions thousands of times per day. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) calls high frequency trading “One of the most
significant market structure developments in recent years” SEC (2010). SEC chairwoman
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See for example Lauricella and Strasburg (2010).

Mary Schapiro describes the regulatory scheme that applies computer based low-latency
trading as “[an] area that warrants close review” (Schapiro, 2010). Today HFT makes up a
significant portion of U.S. equities market volume.2
Despite the criticism of HFT by the popular press and market participants, early academic
work finds little evidence that the practice is detrimental to financial markets. Recent
studies show that, in aggregate, HFT improves traditional measures of market quality and
contributes to price discovery (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2010, and Brogaard, 2010).
Additionally, Menkveld (2011) examines high frequent traders’ role as a modern market
maker and finds it to be critical to the operation of a new market.
Many HFT strategies rely on the ability to trade fast and frequently.3 Latency
arbitrage is one such strategy in which high frequency traders attempt to profit from
inefficiencies in data between exchanges or other market centers. By submitting large
numbers of orders that are canceled very quickly, a high frequent trader may create
exploitable latency arbitrage opportunities. Brogaard (2010) explains that latency
arbitrage opportunities from quote stuffing may arise from requiring other high frequency
traders to process large amounts of volume giving the high frequency trader submitting the
orders an advantage. A large number of order submissions may also cause the exchange
receiving the quotes to lag other exchanges, creating arbitrage opportunities.
In this study, we identify and analyze the impact intense episodic spikes in quoting activity
have on market conditions, including liquidity and volatility. We find that quote stuffing is
pervasive with several hundred events occurring each trading day and it impacts over 74%
2
3

Brogaard(2010) estimates that HFT makes up 77% of dollar trading volume in U.S. equities.
See Gomber, Arndt, Lutat, and Uhle (2011) and Brogaard (2010) for detailed descriptions of HFT strategies.
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of US listed equities. Our results suggest that, in periods of intense quoting activity, stocks
experience decreased liquidity, higher trading costs, and increased short term volatility.
Thus, quote stuffing may exhibit some of the market degrading features criticized in the
media.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes related
literature. Section 3 describes the data as well as the procedure we employ to identify
quote stuffing events. Section 4 outlines the methodology and studies the impact of quote
stuffing intervals on traditional measures of market quality. Section 5 provides discussion
on the implications of the study’s results and concludes.
1.2 Background

This paper is most closely related to a small but growing body of literature that addresses
questions concerning high frequency and algorithmic trading (hereafter, AT)4.
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) explain that declining technology costs, as well
as trading becoming increasing electronic, has made it easier and cheaper for firms to
implement computer programs to make trading decisions, submit orders and modify those
orders after submission. Today, orders submitted via computer algorithms make up over
two thirds of U.S. equities market volume.
Hendershott and Riordan (2009) use data from the 30 largest DAX stocks on the Deutche
Boerse to determine the role of AT in the price discovery process. They find AT represents
a large fraction of the order flow. For sample stocks, AT demand (supply) represents 52%
AT is broadly defined as the use of a computer algorithm to automatically submit, cancel, and otherwise
manage orders. HFT is a subset of AT.
4
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(50%) of trading volume. 5 Algorithmic traders also contribute more to price discovery
than their human counterparts. Algorithmic traders are more likely to be at the inside
quote when spreads are high than when spreads are low suggesting that algorithmic
traders supply liquidity when it is expensive and demand liquidity when it is cheap. The
authors find no evidence that AT increases volatility. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld
(2011) examine the impact AT has on the market quality of New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) listed stocks. Using a normalized measure of NYSE message traffic, they measure
the causal effect of AT on liquidity surrounding the NYSE’s implementation of automatic
quote dissemination in 2003. They find that AT narrows spreads, reduces adverse
selection, and increases the informativeness of quotes, especially for larger stocks. These
results suggest that AT improves liquidity and market quality.
Others project the impact HFT has on financial markets. Theoretical models of HFT trading
show that it is possible for HFT to enhance or degrade market quality. Cvitanic and
Kirilenko (2010) develop a theoretical model that predicts the presence of high frequency
traders is likely to cause a change in average transaction prices with more mass around the
center and thinner tails. This price distribution arises as high frequency traders “snipe” out
human orders, which are away from the inside of the book. Volume, intertrade duration,
and liquidity should all increase with changes in the speed and quantity of human order
submissions. As the proportion of transactions submitted by computers grows, the
forcastability of transactions prices should increase.

Liquidity demanding trades are trades that occur via marketable orders (i.e market orders, limit orders to
buy above the current ask, or limit orders to sell below the current bid). Liquidity supplying trades are trades
from non-marketable orders (i.e. limit orders to sell above the current bid or limit orders to buy below the
current ask). Marketable orders take liquidity from the market whereas non-marketable orders add liquidity.
5
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Cartea and Penalva (2011) examine the impact of HFT on financial markets using a model
with three types of traders: liquidity traders, market makers, and high frequency traders.
According to their model, high frequency traders increase the price impact of liquidity
trades, increasing (decreasing) the price at which liquidity traders buy (sell). These costs
increase with the size of the trade, suggesting that large liquidity traders (i.e. large
institutional traders making sizable changes to their portfolio) will be most affected by
HFT. Market makers are compensated for losses in revenues to high frequency traders by a
higher liquidity discount. Thus, HFT does not affect the number of market makers. The
authors also propose that HFT increases price volatility and doubles volume.
Most empirical studies on HFT find it to have a moderate to significantly positive impact on
traditional market quality measures. Brogaard (2010) examines the impact of HFT on the
US equities market using a unique HFT dataset for 120 stocks listed on NASDAQ. Brogaard
finds that HFT improves market conditions. HFT adds to the price discovery process,
provides the best bid and offer quotes for a significant portion of the trading day, and
reduces volatility. However the extent to which HFT improves liquidity is mixed as the
depth high frequency traders provide to the order book is one-fourth of that provided by
non-high frequency traders. Broggard’s analysis also suggests that HFT is a profitable
venture generating trading profits of $2.8 billion annually. Hasbrouck and Sarr (2010) use
NASDAQ order level data to examine the impact that low latency traders have on market
characteristics including volatility, total price impact, and book depth. They measure HFT
activity by identifying “strategic runs” of submission, cancellation, and executions. The
authors find that HFT improves market quality thru decreasing short term volatility,
spreads, and depth of the order book.
5

Contrary to the aforementioned empirical studies, Zhang (2010) finds that HFT may
increase stock price volatility and impede the market’s ability to incorporate firm
fundamentals into asset prices. Zhang uses CRSP and Thomason Reuters Institutional
Holdings databases to estimate HFT dollar volume. He finds a positive correlation between
HFT and quarterly volatility and this relation is strongest for larger stocks. Zhang also
finds that firms with more HFT tend to overreact to firm fundamental news such as
earnings surprises.
Other studies examine the role of high frequency traders in the May 6, 2010 flash crash.
Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2010) examine the behavior of high frequency traders
in E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts during the events surrounding the flash crash. HFT
patterns surrounding the flash crash are inconsistent with traditional market making.
They conclude that, while high frequency traders did not cause the flash crash, their
response to the high selling pressure exacerbated volatility. Madhavan (2012) analyzes the
relation between market structure and the flash crash. He finds that firms with higher
fragmentation prior to the flash crash were disproportionately susceptible to rapid price
movements on the day of the crash and provides a framework with which to evaluate new
market structure reforms.
HFT is also described as modern market making. Menkveld (2011) examines HFT and its
role as a modern market maker. Menkveld documents how one large high frequency trader
that acts as a market maker is critical to the operation of a new market, Chi-X. He provides
detailed analysis on the trading behavior of the high frequency trader. The high frequency
trader provides liquidity and its entrance corresponds with a decrease in spreads.

6

Our study adds to the literature by exploring quote stuffing, a strategy in which a large
number of orders to buy or sell securities are placed and then canceled almost
immediately. Market participants criticize this practice stating that it creates a false sense
of the true supply and demand for a stock and may adversely impact market quality. Also,
unlike previous empirical studies of HFT in U.S. equities markets, which use data from a
single market center, we examine HFT behavior across all U.S. exchanges. Considering the
fragmentation of order flow in U.S. markets, we believe that using data from all US
exchanges will glean a more complete picture of the impact of quote stuffing on overall
market conditions.
1.3 Data and Identification of Quote Stuffing

1.3.1 Data
The primary data source for this paper is the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) data.
Our sample includes all trades and quotes for NYSE and NASDAQ listed stocks for all
trading days in 2010. We apply conventional filters to TAQ, excluding trades and quotes
that are coded as having an error or a correction, or are reported out of time sequence. In
addition, we omit a quote if the bid is greater than the ask, or the bid and/or ask price is
less than zero. Securities with an average trade price less than $3 are also eliminated.
We use TAQ data to both identify quote stuffing episodes and calculate measures of market
quality. Our analysis is restricted to normal trading hours (9:30am to 4:00 pm). When
merging trades and quotes we follow Bessembinder (2003) and do not lag quote time

7

stamps. CRSP data is used to compute daily trading statistics and to determine listing
exchange.

1.3.2 Use of TAQ Data to Identify Quote Stuffing
It is not typically possible to identify orders that are generated by computer
algorithms in U.S. equity markets. As a result, previous studies use proxies to measure the
level of AT and HFT.6 These proxies are typically derived using system order data, which
identify electronic messages including order submissions, cancelations, and executions
handled by an individual exchange. For example, Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011)
use the number of electronic messages handled by NYSE’s SuperDOT system and captured
in the NYSE’s System Order Data (SOD) database as a proxy measure of AT. Hasbrouck and
Saar (2010) compute their proxy for low-latency trading using NASDAQ TotalView-ITCH,
which includes submission, cancelations, and trade executions for orders received by
NASDAQ. Using this data the authors develop a proxy for HFT by identifying “strategic
runs,” which the authors define as “linked submissions that are likely to be parts of a
dynamic strategy” (Page 19).
Unlike the proxies developed by the aforementioned studies, we use TAQ data to
identify heightened periods of low latency activity. In contrast to system order data, TAQ
data does not include information on individual order submissions and cancelations, but
contains consolidated quotes from all exchanges in the national market system. Despite

A notable exception is Borgaard (2010), who uses a proprietary date set to identify high frequency traders’
orders on NASDAQ.
6
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not containing information on individual orders, submissions and cancelations of
marketable orders are reflected in consolidated quote updates of TAQ. Thus, frequent
quote updates in TAQ are likely to be highly correlated proxies of HFT based on system
order data7.
An attractive feature of TAQ, as opposed to order data, for our study is that it includes
quote updates for all exchanges that trade U.S. equities. Unlike the U.S. equity market of
just over a decade ago where a few venues commanded an overwhelming share of market
activity, today’s market is fragmented with order flow going to an increasing number of
trading venues. Egginton, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2012) note that, in 2000, the NYSE
garnered over 80% of trading volume for NYSE listed securities. NYSE market share has
decreased dramatically to a 2010 level of approximately 30%. Egginton, Van Ness, and Van
Ness (2012) observe a similar pattern for NASDAQ listed securities. Virtually all trades for
NASDAQ listed securities execute on NASDAQ in 2001, by 2010 the share of trading volume
had declined to 40%. Quote stuffing is likely to involve order submission strategies that
span multiple trading venues possibly in an attempt to exploit inefficiencies that may arise
in prices across exchanges. Thus examining HFT behavior across market centers should
provide a more complete picture of the impact of quote stuffing on overall market
conditions.

1.3.3 Identification of Quote Stuffing

We spot check several instances where Hasbrouck and Saar (2010) identify an elevated number of “strategic
runs”, all instances are marked with an increase in quoting activity reported in TAQ.
7
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We examine quote stuffing events by identifying intense episodic spikes in quoting
activity. To identify spikes we first divide the trading day (9:30-4:00) into 390 one-minute
segments. Next, we calculate the intraday variation in quoting activity by computing the
average standard deviation of one-minute segments for rolling twenty-day windows. We
identify intense quoting episodes as segments in which the level of quoting activity exceeds
the previous twenty-day mean number of quotes-per-minute by at least 20 standard
deviations. We also require the average number of quotes for the entire trading day not
exceed its previous twenty-day rolling average by more than two standard deviations. The
latter requirement is implemented to exclude trading days with an unusually high level of
quoting activity.
We group multiple one-minute segments into a single quote stuffing event when the
duration between high quoting episodes is less than or equal to 10 minutes. Grouping of
one-minute segments yields a total of 58,737 unique quote stuffing events with durations
ranging from one to ten minutes.8 As our goal is to identify information-free intense
episodes of quoting activity, we attempt to eliminate conflicting events by using CRSP and
Compustat to identify corporate announcements. We exclude any quote stuffing event that
occurs within a [-3; +3] window surrounding an earnings or dividend announcement as
identified in Compustat and CRSP.
Finally, we eliminate events if there is an influx in trading in the ten minutes prior to
the spike in quoting activity. This later restriction is implemented to eliminate large
episodes of quote updating driven by increased trading. Additionally, increases in liquidity

8

Events with duration longer than 10 minutes are excluded from the sample.
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demanding trades may inflate market quality measures. Filtering events with increased
trading in the minutes prior to the influx in quoting activity yields a final sample size of
25,418 events.
Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics for sample firms that undergo at least one
quote stuffing event during the year. Mean daily volume of shares traded ranges from 240
to 562 million, with a mean of 141,000 thousand shares. Sample firm size also spans a
large range from $530,000 to $237 billion. Median closing price and daily returns are
$14.28 and 0.08% respectively. Daily statistics are computed as the average over the entire
trading year.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

Panel C of table 1 lists the number of events by duration. The majority (72%) of events
lasts less than one minute with over 94% lasting less than six minutes. The magnitude of
events ranges from 20 to 925 standard deviations above its previous 20 day average, 36%
of the events fall between 20 and 30 standard deviations and an additional 42% of events
occur between 30 and 40 standard deviations (see Table 1 Panel B).
Figure one displays standardized quotes and trades in the window [-10, +10]
surrounding the quote stuffing events. As expected quoting activity peaks at time 0 at a
level of over 4 times the pre and post 10 minute averages. Trading activity peaks at time
+1 and remains elevated through minute +10.

11

[Insert Figure 1 Here]

Several summary statistics not tabulated in table 1 are noteworthy. First, large spikes in
quoting activity occur relatively frequently with an average of roughly 125 such events
occurring each day. These large spikes in activity also impact a large number of firms;
5292 or roughly 74.7% of all US listed equities experience at least one event during the
2010 trading year.
1.4 Impact of Quote Stuffing on Market Quality

1.4.1 Measures of Market Quality
We employ an event study methodology to gauge the impact quote stuffing has on market
conditions. We use TAQ data to compute several measures of market quality. For each
minute in the ten-minute window immediately prior to and after the quote stuffing event.
Our measures of market quality include two measures of short-term volatility and three
measures of liquidity. Voltil is the one-minute standard deviation of trade prices. As an
alternative measure of short term volatility we calculate HighLow, which is the highest
quoted midpoint in the one-minute interval minus the lowest quoted midpoint in the
interval (this measure is similar to the HighLow measure of Hasbrouck and Saar, 2010). To
measure liquidity we use Quoted, Percent-Quoted, and Effective Spreads (QSprd, Pqsprd,
and Effsprd). Qsprd is the average spread (ask price minus bid price) of the one minute

12

interval. Pqsprd is the spread scaled by the midpoint, [

(

)

], then averaged over the

one-minute interval. Effsprd is a measure of the price impact of a trade and is computed as
the average effective half spread (absolute value of the trade price minus the prevailing
midpoint) of all trades during the one-minute interval.
Figure 2 and 3 graphically depict while table 2 reports mean market quality statistics for
the quote stuffing interval (time 0), the ten minutes prior (time -10 thru -1), and the ten
minutes immediately following (+1 thru +10) the events. All three measures of liquidity
(Qsprd ,Pqsprd, and Effsprd) remain relativity constant in the minutes prior to the influx of
quoting activity then abruptly increase during the event window. In the minutes following
the event both Qsprd and Pqsprd decline gradually until reaching their pre-event average in
minute 4. In the pre-event window Effsprd follows a similar patten to Qsprd and Pqsprd
remaining relatively constant before increasing sharply to a level of $0.04. In the minutes
following the event period Effsprd declines but unlike Qsprd and Pqsprd, it remains
elevated, not dropping below $0.026 in minutes +1 thru +10.
Measures of market quality also follow the pattern of the liquidity measures increasing
sharply during the event period. Voltil begins increasing in minute -2 and declines to its
pre event window average by minute +5. Highlow rises from a minute -10 level of $0.025
to an event period level of $0.061 and subsequently declines to a minute +10 level of
$0.026.

[Insert Table 2 Here]
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[Insert Figure 2 Here]
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
The identified intense episodes of quoting activity are associated with decreased liquidity,
higher trading costs, and increased short-term volatility.

1.4.2 Regression Results
To further explore the impact of quote stuffing on market quality we run a series of
panel regressions, which control for other factors that may impact market quality. Each
regression uses data from the event period as well as the ten one-minute periods
immediately preceding (pre periods) and following (post periods) the event. We estimate
the following equation to test for a relation between quote stuffing and effective spread:
.
Where

(1)

is the average effective half spread for stock i in minute t;

dummy variable equal to 1 for event segments and 0 otherwise;
variable equal to 1 for the period following the event;
deviation of the midpoint for stock i in minute t;

is a

is also a dummy
is the standard

is a measure of activity and is

computed as the number of trades that execute in minute t for stock i. For this model as
well as all subsequent regressions, we include event window fixed effects, which uniquely
identify each event window.

14

We estimate similar models to examine the impact quote stuffing has on quoted and
percent quoted spreads:
(2)

(3)

Where

and

are the average quoted and percent quoted spreads for

stock i in minute t; and all other variables are as previously described.
We also estimate a similar model for one minute

(see Equation (4)).
(4)

Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients for market quality regressions. The
positive sign of the

coefficient is expected. This positive sign is consent with

previous work on the determinants of spreads. The coefficient on

has the expected

sign for regressions with Qsprd and Pqsprd as the dependent variable.
The coefficient of primary interest is

, which measures the impact that identified

quote stuffing events have on market quality. The coefficient of DURING is positive
significant for all regression specifications. This positive coefficient suggests that intervals

15

experiencing a large influx of quoting activity are associated with higher posted and
effective spreads and increased short-term volatility.
The coefficient on the

dummy variable is positive in the Effsprd,

, and

Volitil regressions. However it is nearly an order of magnitude smaller than the coefficient
on during in all three regressions. Our regression suggests that, in the post-event window,
both spreads and short-term volatility remain slightly elevated compared to their preevent level.

[Insert Table 3 Here]

Given that our quote stuffing episodes are of varying durations, it is feasible that the
impact of quote stuffing on market quality depends on the duration of the quote stuffing
event. Therefore, we estimate panel regressions separately for events of varying durations.
Table 4 reports regression results for subsamples consisting of four subdivided event
period duration lengths. (0,1] refers to event periods that last one minute or less, (1,4]
includes event periods with a duration longer than one minute and up to 4 minutes, (4,7]
and (7,10] are similarly defined. The coefficient on

remains significantly positive

for all duration lengths for all measures of market quality. There is a notable pattern when
examining quote stuffing across duration lengths. For Effsprd, the coefficient on
declines from a level of .004 for events with one minute duration to .002 for the (4-7]
events. The coefficient on

in the

regression also displays this declining
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pattern. The overall conclusions reached from the analysis reported in Table 3 are
unaltered.

[Insert Table 4 Here]

For the

regression

follows a slightly altered pattern as event period

duration increases. It increases from a level of .009 for (0,1] to .01 for (1,4] before
declining to .004 for events lasting between seven and ten minutes. The coefficient of
implies that periods of quote stuffing experience an average spreads of .4¢ to 1¢
higher during than pre-event levels.
Hence, quote stuffing may impact the market quality of large market capitalization
stocks differently than small capitalization stocks. We report market quality regression
estimates for four quartiles of firm size in table 5. Size quartiles are based on firms’
average market capitalizations computed over the 2010 trading year. Q1 represents the
smallest market capitalization quartile. Consistent with our previous analysis, the
coefficient on During is positive for all size quartiles and measures of market quality.
However the coefficient on During is smaller for larger firms suggesting that the impact of
quote stuffing on the market quality of smaller firms is less pronounced than for large
stocks. Effsprd remains somewhat elevated in the period following the heightened quoting
activity across size quartiles although this result is more pronounced for smaller firms.
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[Insert Table 5 Here]

To test if quotes stuffing impacts the market quality of NYSE/ARCA and NASDAQ
listed stocks differently we run our analysis separately for samples for stocks listing on the
NYSE/ARCA and NASDAQ exchanges and report results in table 6. Consistent with our
previous analysis, the coefficient on During is positive for both NYSE/ARCA and NASDAQ
listed stocks for all measures of market quality.

[Insert Table 6 Here]

Overall, our results imply that quote stuffing can adversely impact traditional
measures of market quality regardless of the duration of event or the market capitalization
of the firm. Our results confirm that in periods of intense quoting activity stocks
experience decreased liquidity, higher trading costs, and increased short-term volatility.
1.5. Conclusion
In this study we analyze the impact intense episodic spikes in quoting activity has
on market conditions including liquidity and volatility. We find that quote stuffing is
pervasive with several hundred events occurring each trading day and that quote stuffing
impacts over 74.7% of US listed equities during our sample period. Our results show that,
in periods of intense quoting activity, stocks experience decreased liquidity, higher trading

18

costs, and increased short-term volatility. Our results suggest that the HFT strategy of
quote stuffing may exhibit some features that are criticized in the media.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for sample firms and events. The sample period is
from January 2010 to December 2010 and includes all stocks that experience at least one
period of intense quoting activity (“quote stuffing” event) during that time frame. In Panel
A MktCap is the average market capitalization for sample firms(in $ millions), Daily Volume
is the average daily volume(in thousands), Return is the average daily close-to-close
return, and Closing Price is the average closing price. All statistics in panel A are computed
as daily averages for the 2010 trading year and are computed using CRSP data. All
averages are computed on an individual stock basis and then averaged across stocks. Panel
B presents information on the distribution of the magnitude of events. Events are defined
as episodic spikes in quoting activity in which the level of quoting activity exceeds the
previous twenty-day mean number of quotes-per-minute by at least 20 standard
deviations. The number of events that are between 20-30, 30-50, 50-100, 100-250, and
>250 standard deviations of their previous twenty day mean number of quotes-per-minute
are reported. Panel C lists the number of events by duration and their cumulative
distribution.
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
Mean
Median
Std
Min
Max
MktCap($Million)
1973
260
8,934
0.53
237,123
Daily Volume(1000s)
1006
141
8,159
0.24
562,836
Return(%)
0.10
0.08
0.26
-10.04
5.16
Closing Price ($)
21.88
14.28
33.10
0.03
1567.75
Panel B: Quote Stuffing Events
#Of Standard Deviations above
Mean
20-29
30-49
50-99
100-249
>250

Number of Events

Cumulative Percent

9,199
10,754
4,246
1,115
104

36.2%
78.5%
95.2%
99.6%
100.0%

Panel C: Quote Stuffing Events Duration
Number of Events
Length in Minutes
18349
<1
3158
1-2
1213
3-4
730
4-5
520
5-6
450
6-7
307
7-8
269
8-9
228
9-10
194
10-11
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Cumulative Percent
72.2%
84.6%
89.4%
92.3%
94.3%
96.1%
97.3%
98.3%
99.2%
100%

Table 2: Market Quality Stats by period
This table reports mean market quality statistics for the quote stuffing interval (time 0) and
the ten minutes prior (time -10 thru -1) and the ten minutes immediately following (+1
thru +10) the event. Voltil is the one-minute standard deviation of trade prices, HighLow is
the highest quoted midpoint in the one-minute interval minus the lowest quoted midpoint
in the interval, Qsprd is the average spread (ask price minus bid price) of the one minute
interval, Pqsprd is the spread scaled by the midpoint[

(

)

]and then averaged over the

one-minute interval, Effsprd measures the price impact of a trade and is computed as the
average effective half spread (absolute value of the trade price minus the prevailing
midpoint) of all trades during the one-minute interval.
Qsprd
Pqsprd
Effsprd
Voltil
HighLow
-10
0.082
0.006
0.019
0.012
0.025
-9
0.080
0.006
0.020
0.011
0.025
-8
0.080
0.006
0.020
0.011
0.025
-7
0.081
0.006
0.021
0.012
0.026
-6
0.082
0.006
0.021
0.012
0.026
-5
0.081
0.006
0.021
0.012
0.026
-4
0.082
0.006
0.022
0.014
0.027
-3
0.084
0.006
0.023
0.012
0.029
-2
0.086
0.006
0.024
0.013
0.030
-1
0.094
0.007
0.027
0.015
0.040
0
0.116
0.009
0.039
0.021
0.061
+1
0.103
0.008
0.033
0.015
0.039
+2
0.092
0.007
0.029
0.016
0.032
+3
0.087
0.007
0.028
0.016
0.030
+4
0.086
0.006
0.029
0.016
0.030
+5
0.084
0.006
0.027
0.013
0.028
+6
0.082
0.006
0.027
0.015
0.027
+7
0.081
0.006
0.027
0.015
0.027
+8
0.079
0.006
0.026
0.012
0.026
+9
0.079
0.006
0.027
0.013
0.026
+10
0.080
0.006
0.026
0.013
0.026
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Table 3: Regression Results
This table reports the results of regression analyses in which we examine
what impact quote stuffing has on market quality. We use TAQ data to
compute several measures of market quality: Voltil is the one-minute
standard deviation of trade prices, HighLow is the highest quoted midpoint in
the one-minute interval minus the lowest quoted midpoint in the interval,
Qsprd is the average spread (ask price minus bid price) of the one minute
interval, Pqsprd is the spread scaled by the midpoint[

(

)

]and then

averaged over the one-minute interval, Effsprd measures the price impact of a
trade and is computed as the average effective half spread (absolute value of
the trade price minus the prevailing midpoint) of all trades during the oneminute interval. The following model is then estimated:
During is a dummy variable equal to 1 for event segments and 0 otherwise;
Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period following the event,
Midpvolit, is the standard deviation of the midpoint,
is the number of
trades executed in each minute. We include event window fixed effects in
each regression which uniquely identifies each event window. T-Stats are
reported in parenthesis and are based on cluster corrected robust standard
errors.
Effsprd
Qsprd
Pqsprd
Voltil
Post
0.00100***
-0.00133***
-0.00012***
0.00231***
(5.048)
(-2.780)
(-2.992)
(3.462)
During
0.00326***
0.00908***
0.00062***
0.00535***
(10.108)
(13.500)
(11.367)
(4.966)
0.03095
0.25797**
0.01178**
(1.463)
(2.277)
(2.305)
Midpvolit
0.00002***
-0.00002***
-0.00000***
(3.105)
(-2.938)
(-2.959)
Constant
0.01556***
0.08104***
0.00606***
0.01261***
(64.459)
(85.904)
(131.768)
(37.243)
Observations
260,798
475,674
475,674
222,128
R-squared
0.69
0.89
0.89
0.28
F test
30.28
92.51
70.75
16.75
*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
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Table 4: Regressions by Length of Quote Stuffing Event
This table reports the results of regression analysis separately for events
that last different durations. (0,1] refers to event periods that last one
minute or less, (1,4] includes event periods with a duration longer than
one minute and up to 4 minutes, (4,7] and (7,10] are similarly defined.
We use TAQ data to compute several measures of market quality: Voltil
is the one-minute standard deviation of trade prices, HighLow is the
highest quoted midpoint in the one-minute interval minus the lowest
quoted midpoint in the interval, Qsprd is the average spread (ask price
minus bid price) of the one minute interval, Pqsprd is the spread scaled
by the midpoint[

(

)

]and then averaged over the one-minute

interval, Effsprd measures the price impact of a trade and is computed as
the average effective half spread (absolute value of the trade price minus
the prevailing midpoint) of all trades during the one-minute interval.
The following model is then estimated:
During is a dummy variable equal to 1 for event segments and 0
otherwise; Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period following
the event, Midpvolit, is the standard deviation of the midpoint,
is
the number of trades executed in each minute. We include event
window fixed effects in each regression which uniquely identifies each
event window. T-Stats are reported in parenthesis and are based on
cluster corrected robust standard errors.
Panel A: Market Quality Effsprd
Duration
(0,1]
(1-4]
(4-7]
(7-10]
Post
0.00112*** 0.00072
-0.00004
-0.00014
(5.146)
(1.399)
(-0.044)
(-0.078)
During
0.00360*** 0.00295*** 0.00175** 0.00318*
(8.809)
(4.299)
(2.238)
(1.886)
Midpvolit
0.02145
0.11927
0.09884
0.40232
(1.298)
(1.187)
(0.722)
(1.191)
Nts
0.00002** 0.00001** 0.00001
0.00002
(2.476)
(1.988)
(0.786)
(0.420)
Constant
0.01467*** 0.01703*** 0.01820*** 0.01705***
(66.474)
(16.910)
(14.382)
(5.388)
Observations
R-squared
F test

192,597
0.68
23.37

49,749
0.72
14.73

Cont.
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11,313
0.65
2.288

7,139
0.68
1.772

Panel B: Market Quality Qsprd
Duration
(0,1]
(1-4]
Post
-0.00025
-0.00273**
(-0.465)
(-2.232)
During
0.00859*** 0.00973***
(11.819)
(7.136)
Midpvolit
0.16732** 0.95720***
(2.047)
(6.522)
Nts
-0.0000*** -0.0001***
(-2.613)
(-5.309)
Constant
0.07549*** 0.08601***
(104.723)
(64.452)
Observations 330,235
99,762
R-squared
0.89
0.88
F test
60.41
44.69
Panel C: Market Quality Volatil
Duration
(0,1]
(1-4]
Post
0.00204*** 0.00510**
(2.949)
(2.412)
During
0.00534*** 0.00426***
(6.160)
(3.846)
Constant
0.01208*** 0.01289***
(33.754)
(12.121)

(4-7]
-0.0083***
(-3.669)
0.00316
(1.556)
1.05939***
(5.673)
-0.0000***
(-3.134)
0.09713***
(47.855)

(7-10]
-0.00914***
(-2.969)
0.00439*
(1.690)
1.27127***
(5.013)
-0.00011***
(-2.975)
0.10032***
(35.235)

28,399
0.89
13.77

17,278
0.90
14.53

(4-7]
0.00041
(0.548)
0.00198*
(1.834)
0.01370***
(28.699)

(7-10]
-0.00868
(-1.143)
0.01059
(1.014)
0.02489***
(8.476)

Observations 166,909
40,584
8,902
5,733
R-squared
0.22
0.36
0.55
0.19
F test
19.26
7.398
1.737
0.772
*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
T-Stats in Parentheses
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Table 5: Regressions by firm size
This table reports the results of regression analyses preformed
separately for each firm-size quartile. Where Q1 (Q4) is comprised of the
smallest (largest) firms as measured by market capitalization. We use
TAQ data to compute several measures of market quality: Voltil is the
one-minute standard deviation of trade prices, HighLow is the highest
quoted midpoint in the one-minute interval minus the lowest quoted
midpoint in the interval, Qsprd is the average spread (ask price minus
bid price) of the one minute interval, Pqsprd is the spread scaled by the
midpoint[

(

)

]and then averaged over the one-minute interval,

Effsprd measures the price impact of a trade and is computed as the
average effective half spread (absolute value of the trade price minus the
prevailing midpoint) of all trades during the one-minute interval. The
following model is then estimated:
During is a dummy variable equal to 1 for event segments and 0
otherwise; Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period following
the event, Midpvolit, is the standard deviation of the midpoint,
is
the number of trades executed in each minute. We include event
window fixed effects in each regression which uniquely identifies each
event window. T-Stats are reported in parenthesis and are based on
cluster corrected robust standard errors.
Panel A: Market Quality Effsprd
Size
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Post
0.00455*** 0.00127** 0.00051
0.00053**
(3.355)
(2.393)
(1.525)
(2.342)
During
0.00949*** 0.00392*** 0.00280*** 0.00194***
(4.569)
(7.667)
(6.468)
(3.487)
Midpvolit
0.00979
0.05229
0.39541*** -0.03801
(0.705)
(1.111)
(3.929)
(-0.625)
Nts
0.00008*
0.00005*** -0.00000
0.00002***
(1.726)
(2.777)
(-0.275)
(2.700)
Constant
0.04128*** 0.01662*** 0.00950*** 0.01206***
(46.654)
(36.192)
(12.476)
(20.661)
R-squared
F test

0.74
7.624

0.65
17.99

Cont.
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0.53
18.82

0.71
6.868

Panel B: Market Quality Qsprd
Size
Q1
Q2
Post
-0.00375** 0.00059
(-2.471)
(0.581)
During
0.00714*** 0.01737***
(4.179)
(12.707)
Midpvolit
0.09553*
0.54967
(1.709)
(1.588)
Nts
-0.00013*** -0.00009
(-2.754)
(-1.450)
Constant
0.16109*** 0.08043***
(163.521)
(35.009)
R-squared
0.87
0.88
F test
18.88
78.53
Panel C: Market Quality Volatil
Size
Q1
Q2
Post
0.01323
0.00258
(1.383)
(1.141)
During
0.01388*** 0.00952*
(3.093)
(1.736)
Constant
0.01668*** 0.01218***
(3.299)
(10.373)

Q3
-0.0014***
(-3.403)
0.00723***
(10.788)
1.23208***
(10.295)
-0.0001***
(-4.634)
0.03942***
(47.109)

Q4
-0.00177***
(-2.810)
0.00581***
(5.070)
0.68662***
(4.061)
-0.00003***
(-3.640)
0.03571***
(23.789)

0.89
58.46

0.90
10.35

Q3
0.00225**
(2.322)
0.00303***
(5.689)
0.01031***
(21.019)

Q4
0.00109***
(2.929)
0.00425***
(3.844)
0.01324***
(60.779)

R-squared
0.13
0.33
0.31
0.48
F test
6.178
2.388
17.16
8.637
*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
T-Stats in Parentheses
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Table 6: Regressions by listing exchange
This table reports the results of regression analysis separately stock are
listed on NYSE/ARCA and Nasdaq stock exchanges. We use TAQ data to
compute several measures of market quality: Voltil is the one-minute
standard deviation of trade prices, HighLow is the highest quoted midpoint
in the one-minute interval minus the lowest quoted midpoint in the interval,
Qsprd is the average spread (ask price minus bid price) of the one minute
interval, Pqsprd is the spread scaled by the midpoint[

(

)

]and then

averaged over the one-minute interval, Effsprd measures the price impact of
a trade and is computed as the average effective half spread (absolute value
of the trade price minus the prevailing midpoint) of all trades during the
one-minute interval. The following model is then estimated:
During is a dummy variable equal to 1 for event segments and 0 otherwise;
Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period following the event,
Midpvolit, is the standard deviation of the midpoint,
is the number of
trades executed in each minute. We include event window fixed effects in
each regression which uniquely identifies each event window. T-Stats are
reported in parenthesis and are based on cluster corrected robust standard
errors.
Panel A:NYSE/ARCA
Post
During
Midpvolit
Nts
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F test

Effsprd
0.00102***
(4.129)
0.00280***
(7.765)
0.07631
(1.350)
0.00001
(1.518)
0.01161***
(24.350)

Qsprd
-0.00203***
(-4.394)
0.00527***
(8.282)
0.43252**
(2.202)
-0.00003**
(-2.361)
0.04958***
(38.209)

Pqsprd
-0.00009***
(-4.733)
0.00021***
(7.949)
0.01028**
(2.219)
-0.00000**
(-2.491)
0.00212***
(66.152)

Voltil
0.00295***
(3.110)
0.00424***
(2.920)

172,502
0.57
19.24

283,693
0.88
38.74

283,693
0.81
46.50

150,192
0.26
8.569

Cont.
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0.01180***
(24.974)

Panel B:Nasdaq
Post
During
Midpvolit
Nts
Constant

Effsprd
0.00095***
(2.944)
0.00416***
(6.024)
0.04751
(1.328)
0.00002**
(2.397)
0.02174***
(43.586)

Qsprd
0.00192*
(1.866)
0.01778***
(12.154)
0.44917***
(3.243)
-0.00003***
(-3.043)
0.12434***
(81.276)

Pqsprd
0.00002
(0.155)
0.00149***
(10.581)
0.01983**
(2.262)
-0.00000***
(-2.697)
0.01203***
(114.605)

Voltil
0.00066***
(2.591)
0.00502***
(8.446)

0.01391***
(94.841)

Observations
78,122
166,799
166,799
64,315
R-squared
0.76
0.89
0.89
0.64
F test
11.94
71.05
51.18
35.67
*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
T-Stats in Parentheses
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Figure 1
Standarized Quotes and Trades
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Figure 2
Spread by Period
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Figure 3
Effective Spread and Volatility by Period
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ESSAY 2: THE DECLINING ROLE OF THE NASDAQ MARKET MAKERS
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2.1 Introduction

Market makers provide valuable services to traders by providing liquidity to buyers
and sellers when no trading counterparty is immediately available. However, unlike the
NYSE and other designated specialist markets, dealers on NASDAQ have no explicit
obligation to maintain a fair and orderly inside market. Moreover, NASDAQ market makers
face increased competition from electronic based non-intermediated market centers, and
new market participants such as high frequency traders engaging in market making
strategies.
We study the role of the NASDAQ market maker in 2010 and compare it to an earlier
time period. Specifically, we study the liquidity providing behavior of the NASDAQ market
marker in May and June 2010 and May and June 2004. 9 We compare the following in the
2004 and 2010 time periods: the frequency with which NASDAQ market makers are at the
inside quotes; the stock specific factors influencing market makers’ behavior; the number
of market makers who actively quote the stock in our NASDAQ sample; and the relation
between market maker quoting activity and intraday bid-ask spread patterns.
We classify all bid and ask quotes according to whether or not a quote reflects the
trading interest of a NASDAQ market maker or another market participant. We calculate
the inside bid and ask and classify each side of the spread as reflecting the trading interest
of the NASDAQ dealer or other market participants. We use our quote information in the
2004 and 2010 time periods to determine if market makers have a greater relative impact

9

Hereafter we refer to the May and June 2004 as the 2004 period and May and June 2010 as 2010 period.
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on intraday quoted spreads across time periods. We also look at the number market
makers across time periods.
We find that the percentage of time market makers quote at the inside spread
declines substantially from 2004 to 2010. In 2004, the percentage of the trading day that
market makers quote at the inside bid (ask) is 60% (62%) compared to 2010 where
NASDAQ dealers quote at the inside bid (ask) just 12% (11%). The number of market
makers declines from 2004 to 2010. In 2004, NASDAQ listed securities have an average of
12.3 dealers that quote at least 5 times day compared to 7.8 in 2010. We also find evidence
that the influence market makers have on intraday variations in the bid-ask spread
declines over time.
While we observe a decline in dealer provided liquidity from 2004 to 2010 for both
actively and lightly traded securities, this decline is less severe in less actively traded
stocks. In 2010, dealers quote more competitively in stocks with less trading activity and
higher return volatility, suggesting that dealers may still provide valuable liquidity
providing services.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discuss background
literature and develops our testable hypothesizes. Section 3 describes the data used in the
study. Section 4 reports the results of our analyses and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Background/Hypothesis

2.2.1 The changing role of NASDAQ Market Makers
Changes in NASDAQ dealer market making obligations may impact their liquidity
providing behavior. Unlike the NYSE and other designated specialist markets, dealers on
34

NASDAQ have no explicit obligation to maintain fair and orderly inside markets. NASD only
requires market makers to maintain firm bid and ask quotes for the securities in which
they make markets. In 2007, NASDAQ amended trading rule 4613, eliminating the
requirement that dealer quotes be reasonably related to the prevailing price. This
elimination allows for dealers to more easily “back away” from providing liquidity or post
competitive quotes on only one side of the market.10
Past research shows that a substantial proportion of orders on NASDAQ are
preferenced (Chung, Chuwonganant, and McCormick, 2004). Frequently, brokers and
dealers on NASDAQ agree to direct, or preference, customers’ orders to dealers as long as
the dealer will honor the best prevailing price regardless of whether or not she currently
has the best price. Chung, Chuwonganant, and McCormick find that preferenced trades
have a smaller price impact than unpreferenced trades and preferenced trades are less
likely to receive price improvement. Preferencing of orders may cause maker makers to
quote less aggressively and may affect their liquidity providing behavior.
Non-intermediated trading platforms based on an open electronic limit order book
have become increasing prevalent. This increase in non-intermediated markets suggests
the viability of a non-human intermediated market structure. Glosten (1994) develops a
model of an open electronic limit order book. His model suggests that an electronic limit
order structure is “inevitable” in that it should be a center of significant trading volume,
and other market structures, including anonymous dealer markets, will have a difficult
time competing with the electronic limit order book’s market structure. Using an
“Stub quoting” is a practice in which market markers place a bid or offer that is a drastically different than
the prevailing price. For example, suppose a stock is trading at $50, a market maker may place a stub bid at 1
cent or a stub offer at $1000. Stub quoting receives considerable attention in the popular press, especially
after the flash crash of May 6, 2010.
10
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experimental electronic asset market without designated liquidity providers, Bloomfield,
O’Hara, and Saar (2005) find evidence that supports Glosten(1994). They find that
informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. Informed traders use
limit orders to supply liquidity when the value of their information is high. The authors’
findings suggest that, in electronic markets, a market making role emerges endogenously
by informed traders that are less subject to adverse selection.
Competition from other market participants and venues may also impact the
liquidity providing behavior of market makers and crowd out the number of participating
dealers. Market makers face increased competition from high frequency traders. Gomber,
Arndt, Lutat, and Uhle, 2011 document that market making is a high frequency trading
strategy in which simultaneous buy and sell limit orders are submitted to profit from the
bid-ask spread. To execute this strategy high frequency traders often employ sophisticated
“quote matching” programs that update and delete orders based on computer algorithms.
Menkveld (2011) documents how one high frequency trader on the Chi-X exchange acts as
a modern market marker. The high frequency trader provides liquidity and the entrance of
the high frequency trader corresponds with a decrease in spreads.
However, despite changes to market environments and increasing participation of
new market participants, such as high frequency traders, some postulate that the number
of traditional market makers may not be impacted. Cartea and Penalva (2011) develop a
theory of market maker behavior in the presence of high frequency traders. The model
predicts that high frequency traders generate revenue by intermediating trades between
market makers and liquidity traders (equity investors) and charging market prices plus or
minus a “haircut”. Market makers are compensated for losses in revenues to high frequency
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traders by receiving a higher liquidity discount (i.e. less price risk and greater speed) from
trading with high frequency traders. So, increased competition from high frequency
trading may not impact the number of traditional market makers.
Given consideration of the previously discussed literature relating to the viability of
non-intermediated market structures, regulation that alters the obligation of market
makers, and the increased competition faced by market makers, we propose the following
two testable hypothesizes:
H1: The percentage of time that dealer quotes are at the inside spread decreases over time.
and
H2: The number of NASDAQ market makers decreases over time.

2.2.2 Intraday Bid-Ask Spread Patterns and Dealer Participation
Previous studies examine intraday variations in the bid-ask spread (McInish and
Wood, 1992; Chan, Christie, and Schultz, 1995; Barclay , et. al, 1999; etc.). Chung, Van Ness,
and Van Ness (1999) examine the intraday behavior of limit-order traders and the NYSE
specialist. They find that the specialist tends to quote most actively for low activity stocks
and during the morning trading hours when fewer limit orders are submitted. The
majority of posted bid-ask quotes reflect the limit order book and only 6% of posted bidask quotes are the specialist alone at both the bid and the offer. Chung, Van Ness, and Van
Ness also find that intraday variation in bid-ask spread largely reflect the participation of
limit-order traders versus the NYSE specialist.
Due to reasons outlined for hypothesis 1, we believe market maker participation at
the inside quote is decreasing. We question if observed patterns of bid-ask spreads is
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driven, in part, by NASDAQ market maker participation and if the relation between
intraday patterns in the bid-ask and market maker participation has changed over time. If
the relation between NASDAQ dealer quoting behavior and the intraday pattern of the bidask spread declines over time, it suggests that market makers have become less significant
in importance on NASDAQ. We propose as our final hypothesis:
H3: The relation between NASDAQ market makers quoting behavior and observed intraday
patterns in bid-ask spreads decreases over time.
2.3 Data
We compare the behavior of NASDAQ market makers across two time periods, May
and June 2004 and May and June 2010. Data for the study come from several sources. Data
for the 2004 period is obtained from the Nastraq trade and quote data set. Nastraq data
includes trade data, inside quote data, and market maker quote data. Most critical to our
study, the data identifies the participant posting the quote.
We use TotalView-Itch data to identify market maker quotes in the 2010 period,
which includes information about orders and executions on the NASDAQ system. These
data are detailed and include submissions, cancelations, and executions of displayed orders
and executions of non-displayed orders. We use the market participant identification
(MPID) field to identify market participants. We then cross-reference MPIDs against a list
of NASDAQ market participants to identify orders submitted by registered market makers.
We limit our sample to stocks that are listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange. We
exclude stocks that have an average price less than $3, and stocks that average less than
five quote updates per 15 minutes. These filters yield a sample of 2,868 stocks in the 2004
period and 2,221 in the 2010 period.
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We are interested in the activity during the trading day only, so we exclude quotes
that occur before the open (9:30am) and after the close (4:00pm). To minimize data errors
we eliminate quotes in which the bid price is greater than the ask price, quotes where the
bid or ask price is less than zero, and quotes where the bid or ask size is less than or equal
to zero.
Sample summary statistics are reported in table I. Mean daily prices for sample
stocks are $18.33 in 2004 and $17.81 in 2010 and are not statically different from each
other across the two time periods. Similarly, average intraday return volatility for the 2004
and 2010 time periods are consistent, 0.02 in 2004 and 0.02 in 2010. Inside bid-ask
spreads decline from a 2004 level of $0.16 to a 2010 level of $0.11. However, differences
from 2004 and 2010 in the percentage spread (inside spread scaled by the quote midpoint)
and effective spread are not significantly different across time periods.
Both volume and the market value of shares executed ($Volume) increase substantially
from 2004 to 2010. The average number of shares executed per day rises from 496,226 in
2004 to 913,560 in 2010. Market value of shares executing per day more than doubles
from 2004 to 2010. Similarly, the mean number of daily trades for sample stocks increases
2.4 times from 1,198 in 2004 to 4,080 in 2010. Average depth at the inside bid (ask)
increases from 836 (765) shares 2004 to 2617 (2739) in 2010 a 213% (258%) increase.
2.4 Results

2.4.1 Market Maker Participation: Test of Hypothesis 1
We examine the liquidity providing behavior of NASDAQ market makers, in
aggregate. To this end, we identify individual market makers quotes for each stock. Next,
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we identify market maker quotes with the highest bid and lowest ask to generate an
intraday market maker best bid and offer (mmBBO). We compare the mmBBO to the to the
national market system (NMS) highest bid and lowest ask (NBBO).11 If the bid or ask price
of the mmBBO is equal to the inside bid or ask price of the NBBO for a particular stock at a
point in time, we classify the mmBBO as being At Bid or At Ask, respectively. When the bid
and ask prices of the mmBBO and NBBO are both equal, we classify the mmBBO as being At
Both. We also examine the number of shares at the inside quote for both market makers
and the national market system. The mmBBO is classified as being Alone Bid (Alone Ask) if
market makers quotes make up all shares available at the NBBO bid (ask) price. We
indicate the mmBBO is Alone Both if the mmBBO is equal to the NBBO for both bid and ask
prices and quantities. Finally, if neither the bid or ask prices of the mmBBO is equal to the
NBBO, the mmBBO is classified as At Neither.
We divide the number of seconds during the trading day (9:30am-4:00pm) when
marker makers quote at the inside by the total number of seconds in a trading day to obtain
the percentage of the trading day that market makers are At Bid, At Ask, At Both, Alone Bid,
Alone Ask, Alone Both, or At Neither.12
We report the proportion of the trading day that market makers quote at the
national market system best bid and ask price in table II. Panel A reports that, in 2004,
market makers quotes are At Bid (At Ask) 60.1% (62.7%) of the trading day. In the 2010
time period, market makers are at the bid (ask) only 12.3% (11.0%) of the day, a reduction

The Nastraq data, used in the 2004 period, includes an NBBO file. We use NYSE trade and quote data (TAQ)
to compute the NBBO for the 2010 period.
12 Note mmBBO classifications are not mutually exclusive. For example if the mmBBO and NBBO ask price
and size were both equal to $10 and 200 shares then the mmBBO would be classified as being both At Ask,
and Alone Ask.
11
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of 48% (52%) from 2004. The percentage of time that market makers are on both sides of
the NBBO decreases from a 2004 level of 39.3% to a 2010 level of 1.7%. The percentage of
time during the trading day when market makers are alone at the inside quote also declines
substantially across time periods. Alone Bid, Alone Ask, and Alone Both decline 29.6%,
42.0%, and 15.5% respectively, from 2004 to 2010. At Neither increases from 16.0% in
2004 to 78.4% in 2010, a percentage increase of 390%. NASDAQ market makers
participate less frequently at the NBBO in the 2010 period compared to the 2004 period,
which supports hypothesis 1, that the liquidity providing role of NASDAQ market makers is
declining.
Liquidity providing services of market makers is most beneficial to stocks that are
lightly traded. Venkataram and Wasisburd (2007) examine the role of designated dealers
on the Paris Bourse, an electronic limit order market. The authors find that stocks with
designated market makers have better market quality that those without designated
market makers, especially stocks that are less frequently traded. As less liquid, lightly
traded stocks tend to, by definition, have fewer market participants actively quoting and
trading them, these securities benefit the most from the liquidity providing services of
market makers. We divide sample stocks into quartiles based on the average number of
daily transactions in each sample period to explore if market makers participate differently
for stocks with different levels of trading activity. Quartile 1 (Q1) consists of stocks with
the fewest number of daily trades and Quartile 4 (Q4) contains the most active stocks,
based on the mean number of daily transactions. We report the percentage of time market
makers quote at the inside across stock activity quartiles in panel B of table II. Consistent
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with the proportions reported in panel A of table II, the percentage of time that market
makers are at the inside quotes is lower in 2010 than in 2004 for all activity quartiles.
The differences between the 2004 and 2010 time period for At Bid, At Ask, and At Both are
systematically larger for stocks in higher activity quartiles. At Bid (At Ask, At Both) decline
31.0% (36.7%, 25.5%) in Q1 from 2004 to 2010 and decline 64.2%(65.8, 55.2) in Q4 from
2004 to 2010. Differences in At Neither for the 2004 and 2010 sample periods are larger
for stocks in more active quartiles.
Table III reports a comparison of market maker participation within sample periods
across activity quartiles. For both the 2004 and 2010 periods, the percentage of time that
market makers are alone at the inside quote decreases with activity. In the 2004 period
Alone Bid, Alone Ask, and Alone Both decrease from 34.8%, 48.6%, and 19.2%, respectively,
for activity quartile 1 to 33.1%, 41.2%, and 13.4%, respectively, in quartile 4. We observe a
similar decrease in the 2010 period with Alone Bid, Alone Ask, and Alone Both decreasing
from 12%, 10%, and 2%, respectively for activity quartile 1 to 0.7%, 0.7%, and 0.0% in
quartile 4. Stocks that are more actively traded are likely to have more market participants
and thus, more competition in liquidity providing services. Put another way, an increase in
the number of market participants should decrease the chance that NASDAQ dealers will be
alone at the inside quote.
We observe differences in the 2004 and 2010 time periods when looking at the
variations in At Bid, At Ask, and At Both across trading activity portfolios. At Bid, At Ask, and
At Both are all increasing with activity in the 2004 time period. The difference in mean
market maker participation from activity Q1 to activity Q4 for At Bid, At Ask, and At Both
are 24.0%, 19.7%, and 25.2%, respectively. This finding implies that, for the 2004 sample,
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market makers quotes are more competitive for actively traded stocks than for more lightly
traded equities.
We observe market maker participation decreasing with activity in the 2010. The
lowest activity quartile is At Bid, At Ask, and At Both 19.2%, 18.2%, and 5.0% of the trading
day, respectively. For stocks in activity quartiles 2, 3, and 4, market makers are At Bid, At
Ask, and At Both on average 9%, 8%, and 0.5% of the time.
Figure 1 depicts the percentage of time market makers quote at either the inside bid
or ask price and the variations in market maker participation across activity quartiles. In
2004, dealer participation has an upward trend for higher stock activity quartiles. Dealer
participation in 2004 for the least actively traded stocks (quartile 1) is 75%, 81% for
quartile 2, 86% for quartile 3, and 93% for quartile 4. In the 2010 sample period, the trend
in dealer participation across activity quartiles is generally downward, decreasing from
32% in quartile 1 to 16% in quartile 3 then increasing slightly to 18% for quartile 4.
As with the participation reported in table III the graphical depiction suggests that changes
in market maker participation across activity quartiles imply that, in the 2010 period,
market makers provide liquidity more competitively in lightly traded stocks compared to
more actively traded securities. These less actively traded stocks are also more likely to
benefit from market maker liquidity providing services (see Venkataram and Wasisburd,
2007).
NASDAQ market maker quoting behavior is shown to vary systemically based on
market conditions and stock characteristics. Chung and Zhao (2004) examine crosssectional variations in NASDAQ dealer quoting behavior and find that dealer quoting
patterns are consistent with profit maximizing behavior. Chung and Zhao show that
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dealers are more likely to quote at the inside when opportunities for market making
revenues are greater, including when spreads are large, there are fewer market makers,
and there is more frequent trading. Chung and Zhao also show market makers avoid
quoting at the inside when stocks have heightened volatility.
To further explore the change in market maker participation over time we estimate
the following two regressions, which control for cross-sectional variations in stock
characteristics shown to impact dealer quoting behavior:

where
bid or ask for stock i on day t.

the percentage of time market makers quote at the inside
is the mean intraday stock price.

is the

average difference between the lowest ask and the highest bid scaled by the inside quote
midpoint for stock i during the trading day t.

is the intraday trade-to-trade

return standard deviation stock for i on day t.

is the daily number of

transactions for sample stock i on day t scaled by the average daily number of transactions
for all sample stocks in the same period. We scale the number of trades for stock i on day t
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by the average number of daily transactions to adjust for the large increase in average
number of daily trades from the 2004 to 2010.

is the number of

market makers that update their quotes for stock i at least five times on trading day t.
is dummy variable equal to 1 for observations in the 2010 period. Active_Q2,
Active_Q3, and Active_Q4 are dummy variables indicating a stocks level of trading activity.
,

are dummy variables that

interact the 2010 dummy variables with dummy variables representing stock i‘s trading
quartile in 2010.
We report regression results of two specifications of model (1) in table IV panel A.
In the first specification, we exclude our interactive

quartile variables. We

observe a positive relation between the number of actively participating market makers
and the time that market makers quote at the inside ask or bid price in both model
specifications. This observation suggests that a stock with more dealers actively making a
market will have a higher probability that at least one of the dealers is quoting at the inside
bid or offer.
In both specifications of model (1) Price is negatively related to dealer participation
suggesting that higher priced stocks have lower market maker participation at the inside
quote. However, the economic significance of the price participation relation is small. A $1
increase in stock price increases the percentage daily market maker participation by only
0.05%.
The coefficient of Spread is positive in the first specification of model (1) suggesting
that market makers participate at the inside more when spreads are wider. This finding is
consistent with Chung and Zhao (2004), who find that dealers quote at the inside when
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opportunities for market making revenues are greater, including when stocks spreads are
large. In the second specification of model (1), where we include our
interactive

quartile variables, the sign of the spread coefficient is negative.

This negative coefficient is likely due to differences in the relation between quoting at the
inside and the bid-ask spread in the 2004 and 2010 periods. We explore the relation
between bid-ask spreads and dealer participation at the inside across time periods further
when we estimate model (2).
Return Volit is negatively related to dealer participation at the inside in the first
specification of model (1). This coefficient is also consistent with Chung and Zhao (2004),
who show that market makers are more hesitant to place competitive quotes in periods of
heightened uncertainty.
As an additional test of hypothesis 1, we include a dummy variable that indicates the
day is in the 2010 time period. In2010 is negative for both specifications of model (1). The
coefficient of -0.6066 observed for In2010 suggests that the time market makers quote at
the inside is 61% lower in the 2010 period than in 2004. This finding is consistent with
hypothesis 1, which predicts that the percentage of time that dealer quote at the inside
spread decreases over time.
We test for changes in market maker participation from 2004 to 2010 for stocks
with different levels of trading activity in specification 2 of model (1). We include variables
which indicate a stock trading activity quartile and the trading period is 2010 to assess if
changes in market maker participation from 2004 to 2010 is more pronounced for stocks
with different levels of trading activity. The coefficient of
and

,

are all negative. The coefficients of -0.1490 on
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implies that the percentage of time market makers spend at the inside
bid or ask declines 15% more for stocks in the most active quartile from 2004 to 2010 than
stocks in the least active quartile. The negative coefficient of

suggests

that, the decline in market maker participation at the inside is particularly pronounced for
the most actively traded equities compared to the most lightly traded securities.
We estimate model (2) for both the 2004 and 2010 time periods and report results
in table IV panel B. Similar to the estimation results of model (1), we observe a positive
correlation between the number of actively participating market makers and the
percentage of time they quote at the inside ask or bid price. Also consistent with the result
in model (1), the number of trades and dealer participation are negatively related.
The relation between the percentage of time that market makers quote at the inside
and both Spread and Return Volit change from positive in 2004 to negative in 2010. The
negative coefficient for spread implies that, in 2010, market makers provide less liquidity
to stocks with higher spreads. The negative coefficient for spread and volatility is
consistent with past research that shows in times of increased uncertainty an increase in
the proportion of orders executed by market makers (Li, McCormick, and Zhao, 2005).
The signs of the coefficients for the activity quartile dummy variables are consistent
with our univariate and model (1) analyses. In the 2004 time period, market makers are
more likely to be at the inside for more actively traded securities. A coefficient of 0.0770
for Active_Q4 implies that market makers spend 8% more time at the inside quote for the
most active stocks versus the stocks the in the lowest activity quartile. In the 2010 period
the coefficient of Active_Q4 suggest that market makers are at the inside quote 12% less for
actively traded stocks relative to lightly traded securities. The finding that dealers quote
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more competitively in stocks with less trading activity and higher return volatility in 2010
suggests that dealers may still provide valuable liquidity providing services as less actively
traded stocks are more likely to benefit from market maker liquidity providing services
(Venkataram and Wasisburd, 2007).

2.4.2 Variation in number of NASDAQ Market Makers: Test of Hypothesis 2
We determine if the average number of market makers changes from the 2004 to
2010 time periods. Table V panel A reports the mean number of market makers
participating in sample stocks in both the 2004 and 2010 time periods. Consistent with the
methodology of Chung and Zhao (2004), market makers are classified as “active” if they
submit at least five quote updates during the trading day. We report daily means for both
the total number of market makers and active market makers. We find that the number of
market makers declines across time periods. From 2004 to 2010, the average number of
active (total) market makers per stock declines from 12.3 (35.4) to 7.8 (29.5). This
reduction is consistent with hypothesis 2 that number of NASDAQ dealers decreases over
time.
We also report the number of participating market makers by stock trading activity
quartile. The number of market makers participating (both aggregate and actively)
declines from 2004 to 2010 in all quartiles. This decline appears to be much larger for
actively traded stocks. The changes in active market makers from 2004 to 2010 for activity
quartile 4 is 14.2 compared to no decline in the number of active market makers in quartile
1. These statistics are consistent with those reported in section 4.1, showing that market
makers participate more in less actively traded stocks in the 2010 period.
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2.4.3 Intraday Bid-Ask Spread and Market Maker Participation: Test of Hypothesis 3
Changes in market maker participation are likely to alter the impact market makers have
on the intraday pattern of the bid-ask spread. We explore if intraday patterns in bid-ask
spreads for NASDAQ listed stocks reflect the participation of NASDAQ market makers and
test if the influence market makers have on intraday bid-ask spread patterns have changed
over time.
We first divide the 6.5 hour trading day (9:30am-4:00pm) into 26 15-minute
segments. Table VI reports and figure II depicts intraday variations in standardized bid-ask
spreads and market maker participation. Market maker participation is computed for each
15-minute segment by tabulating the amount of time that at least one market maker’s
quote is equal the NMS highest bid or lowest ask price and dividing this amount of time by
the total number of seconds in a 15 minute segment (900 seconds). Market maker
participation is the percentage of time that dealers are at the bid or ask quote during each
15-minute segment. Standardized intraday spreads are is computed as (si,t,j-mi,t)/sdi,t
where si,t,j is the average bid-ask spread for stock i on day t, in the 15-minute intraday
trading segment j; mi,t is the mean spread for the stock i on day t; and sdi,t is the standard
deviation in spreads for stock i over day t. We also standardized the time market makers
quote at the inside spread for figure II.
The intraday pattern of bid-ask spreads is similar in both the 2004 and 2010 sample
periods. Spreads are wider near the beginning of the trading day and decline at a
decreasing rate through the close of trading. The declining patterns observed in bid-ask
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spreads in both time periods are similar to that observed in prior studies of NASDAQ bidask spreads (Chan, Christie, and Schultz, 1995; Barclay , et. al, 1999).
Intraday variations in market maker participation differ in 2004 compared to 2010.
In 2004 market maker participation is lowest during the early periods and generally
increases at a decreasing rate throughout the trading day. This pattern in market maker
participation appears to be negatively related to the intraday patterns of bid-ask spreads in
2004. Participation of market makers is more sporadic in 2010. It is difficult to see a clear
pattern in the relation between intraday spread variations and market maker participation.
To more formally explore the relation of the intraday bid-ask spread and intraday NASDAQ
market maker participation we estimate the following models:

(4)

where

is the standardized spread for stock i on day t in segment j.

is a vector of dummy variables for each of the 26 15-minute segments.

is

a vector of variables that indicate market maker participation variables for each segment.
Market maker participation is computed as the percentage of time that market makers are
at either the inside bid or ask price for stock i on day t in segment j.

is the

standard deviation of trade-to-trade returns for stock i on day t in segment j.
is the number of trades which execute for stock i on day t in segment j.
are included as controls for risk and activity, respectively,
which are shown to be determinant of the bid-ask spread (McInish and Wood, 1992).
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Table VII Panel A reports regression results for the estimation of model (3) for both
the 2004 and 2010 time period. As the primary purpose in estimating the first model is to
show how spreads vary throughout the trading day we report only the coefficients from the
segment indicators variables for brevity. Regression results confirm the graphical
observation in figure 2. Spreads are wider near the beginning of the trading day and
decline at a decreasing rate through the close of trading in both the 2004 and 2010 time
periods.
Table VII Panel B reports regression results from estimation of model (4) for both
the 2004 and 2010 time periods. We report only market maker participation variables for
each segment. All coefficients for intraday market maker participation variables are
negative in the regression for the 2004 period. The negative sign on all participation
variable coefficients indicates that there is a negative relation between the participation of
market makers and intraday bid-ask spreads in the 2004 time period.
The relation between bid-ask spreads and market maker participation in the 2010
period is less clear. Coefficients for market maker participation variables near the open of
trading are negative which indicates that more market maker participation lowers bid-ask
spreads during these segments. For other segments throughout the trading day the
relation between market maker participation and bid-ask spreads is more sporadic.
Coefficients on market maker participation variables are either insignificant or positive.
The finding that market maker participation has a more sporadic relation with the
bid-ask spread in 2010 coupled with lower market maker participation observed in the
2010 time period is consistent with hypothesis 3 that market maker influence on bid-ask
spreads is declining. The reduced influence of market maker participation on variations in
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the bid-ask spread in 2010 is additional evidence that the impact of market makers on
NASDAQ is declining.

2.5 Conclusion
We examine if the role of the NASDAQ market marker is declining. We include an
analysis of the quoting behavior of NASDAQ dealers, the number of dealers that make
markets in NASDAQ-listed securities over time, and the relation of intraday market maker
participation and intraday bid-ask spread patterns.
We document a declining role of NASDAQ market makers. Market maker
participation declines substantially over our sample period. In 2004, the percentage of the
trading day that market makers quote at the inside bid (ask) is 60% (62%) compared to
2010 when NASDAQ dealers quote at the inside bid (ask) just 12% (11%). The number of
market makers declines. We also find evidence that the relation between market maker
participation and intraday variations in the bid-ask declines over time. While we observe a
decline in dealer provided liquidity from 2004 to 2010 for both actively and lightly traded
securities, this decline is less severe in less actively traded stocks suggesting that dealers
may still provide valuable liquidity providing services.
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Table I: Summary Statistics
Price is the mean stock price during each period. Inside spread is the average distance
between the lowest ask and the highest bid. P. Spread is the inside spread scaled by the
quote midpoint. Bid Depth and Ask Depth are the average number of shares quoted at the
highest bid and lowest ask, respectively. Eff. Spread is the absolute value of the trade
price minus the prevailing midpoint. Return Volit. is the average intraday trade to trade
return standard deviation. Volume is the mean number of shares per stock which
execute per day. $Volume is the mean total market value of shares which execute for
sample firms per trading day. Num. Trades is the average daily number of transaction for
sample stock. Data sources include TAQ, Nastraq, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch for May
and June 2004 and 2010.
*,**,*** Indicate statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
Whole
2004
2010
Diff [2010Sample
2004]
Price
18.10
18.33
17.81
-0.52
Inside Spread
0.14
0.16
0.11
-0.05***
P. Spread (%)
1.2
1.2
1.2
-0.02
Bid Depth (100s)
16
8
26
18***
Ask Depth (100s)
16
7
27
20***
Eff Spread
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.00
Return Volit
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.00
Volume (1000s)
678
496
913
417***
$Volume (1000s)
16,970
10,602
25,193
14,591***
Num. Trades
2,456
1,198
4,080
2,881***
Number of Firms

5,089

2,868
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2,221

Table II: Market Maker Participation
This table reports the mean percentage of the trading day that NASDAQ market makers quote at the NBBO. At Bid (At Ask) is the
total number of seconds that at least one market maker quotes at the NMS (National Market System) highest (lowest) bid (ask)
price divided by the total number of seconds in the trading day. At Both is the total number of seconds that NASDAQ market
makers quote at both the NMS highest bid and lowest ask price divided by the total number of seconds in the trading day. Alone
At Bid (Alone At Ask) is the total number of seconds that market makers quotes are the only quotes at the NMS highest (lowest)
bid (ask) price divided by the total number of seconds in the trading day. Alone at both is the total number of seconds that
market makers quotes are the only quotes at the NMS highest bid and lowest ask price divided by the total number of seconds in
the trading day. At Neither is the percentage of time during the trading day that market makers do not quote at either the inside
bid or ask. Sample stocks are divided into quartiles based on year and trading activity with quartile 1 (Q1) consisting of stocks
with the lowest number of average daily trades and quartile 4 (Q4) consisting of stocks with the largest number of average daily
trades. Data sources include TAQ, Nastraq, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch for May and June 2004 and 2010.
*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
At Bid (%)
At Ask (%)
At Both (%)
Alone Bid (%)
Alone Ask (%)
Alone Both (%)
At Neither (%)
Panel B: Activity

At Bid (%)
At Ask (%)
At Both (%)
Alone Bid (%)
Alone Ask (%)
Alone Both (%)
At Neither (%)

2004
60.1
62.7
39.3
33.9
45.7
16.0
16.0
Q1
(Least Trades)
2004 2010
Diff [10-04]
50.1
19.2
-31.0***
54.8
18.2
-36.7***
30.5
5.0
-25.5***
34.8
11.8
-23.0***
48.6
10.0
-38.6***
19.2
2.0
-17.2***
24.0
67.4
43.5***

2010
12.3
11.0
1.7
4.3
3.7
0.5
78.4
Q2

2004
54.6
57.7
31.7
34.5
47.3
16.5
19.3

2010
10.8
9.8
0.9
3.3
3.0
0.1
80.2

Diff [2010-2004]
-47.8***
-51.7***
-37.6***
-29.6***
-42.0***
-15.5***
62.4***
Q3

Diff [10-04]
-43.7***
-47.9***
-30.8***
-31.2***
-44.4***
-16.4***
60.9***

2004
61.4
63.9
39.3
33.0
45.7
15.0
13.9

2010
9.0
7.4
0.5
1.2
1.1
0.01
84.1

Diff [10-04]
-52.4***
-56.6***
-38.9***
-31.8***
-44.7***
-15.0***
70.2***

2004
74.2
74.5
55.8
33.1
41.2
13.4
6.9

Q4
(Most Trades)
2010
Diff [10-04]
10.0
-64.2***
8.7
-65.8***
0.6
-55.2***
0.7
-32.4***
0.7
-40.4***
0.0
-13.4***
81.8
74.9***
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Panel A:

Panel B: 2010
At Bid (%)
At Ask (%)
At Both (%)
Alone Bid (%)
Alone Ask (%)
Alone Both (%)
At Neither (%)

19.2
18.2
5.0
11.8
10.0
2.0
67.4

9.0
7.4
0.5
1.2
1.1
0.0
80.2

10.0
8.7
0.6
0.7
0.7
0.0
84.1

10.0
8.7
0.6
0.7
0.7
0.0
81.8

-9.2***
-9.5***
-4.4***
-11.1***
-9.3***
-2.0***
-14.4***
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Table III: Activity
This table reports the mean percentage of the trading day that NASDAQ market makers quote at the NBBO. At Bid (At
Ask) is the total number of seconds that at least one market maker quotes at the NMS (National Market System) highest
(lowest) bid (ask) price divided by the total number of seconds in the trading day. At Both is the total number of seconds
that NASDAQ market makers quote at both the NMS highest bid and lowest ask price divided by the total number of
seconds in the trading day. Alone At Bid (Alone At Ask) is the total number of seconds that market makers quotes are the
only quotes at the NMS highest (lowest) bid (ask) price divided by the total number of seconds in the trading day. Alone
at both is the total number of seconds that market makers quote are the only quotes at the NMS highest bid and lowest
ask price divided by the total number of seconds in the trading day. At Neither is the percentage of time during the
trading day that market makers do not quote at either the inside bid or ask. Sample stocks are divided into quartiles
based on year and trading activity with quartile 1 (Q1) consisting of stocks with the lowest number of average daily
trades and quartile 4 (Q4) consisting of stocks with the largest number of average daily trades. Data sources include TAQ,
Nastraq, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch for May and June 2004 and 2010. *,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level respectively
Panel A: 2004
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-Q4
(Least Trades)
(Most Trades)
At Bid (%)
50.1
54.6
61.4
74.2
24.0***
At Ask (%)
54.8
57.7
63.9
74.5
19.7***
At Both (%)
30.5
31.7
39.3
55.8
25.2***
Alone Bid (%)
34.8
34.5
33.0
33.1
-1.8***
Alone Ask (%)
48.6
47.3
45.7
41.2
-7.4***
Alone Both (%)
19.2
16.5
15.0
13.4
-5.8***
At Neither (%)
24.0
19.3
13.9
6.9
17.1***

Table IV: Market Maker Participation
OLS regression results are reported for NASDAQ market maker’s quoting participation.
Dependent variable is the percentage of time during the trading day that market makers
quote at the NMS (National Market System) highest bid or lowest ask. Pricei,t is the mean
intraday stock price. Spreadi,t is the average distance between lowest ask and the highest
bid during the trading day. Return Voliti,t is the intraday trade-to-trade return standard
deviation. Num Trades i,t the daily number of transactions for sample stock i. Num Mkt
Makers i,t is the number of market makers that quote at least five times in a trading day.
is dummy variables equal to 1 for observations in the 2010 period. Active_Q2 i,
Active_Q3 i, Active_Q4 i are dummy variables indicating a stocks level of trading activity
Where Active_Q4 is 1 for the 25% most actively traded stocks. In2010*active_Q2,
In2010*active_Q3, and In2010*active_Q4 are dummy variables that interact the 2010
dummy variable with a dummy variable representing stock i’s trading quartile in 2010.
Data sources include TAQ, Nastraq, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch for May and June 2004 and
2010. *,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
Panel A: Market Maker Participation
Price
-0.0005***
-0.0005***
(-20.55)
(-20.97)
Spread
1.2648***
-0.1120***
(39.47)
(-3.18)
Return Volit
-0.0429***
-0.0159
(-2.90)
(-1.09)
Num Trades
-0.0025***
-0.0019***
(-17.99)
(-13.76)
Num Mkt Makers
0.0067***
0.0066***
(94.72)
(95.01)
In2010
-0.6066***
-0.4948***
(-655.16)
(-310.45)
In2010*active_Q2
-0.1176***
(-60.96)
In2010*active_Q3
-0.1666***
(-84.31)
In2010*active_Q4
-0.1490***
(-73.51)
Constant
0.7585***
0.7712***
(624.85)
(641.88)
Observations
R-squared
F test
(cont.)

197,360
0.75
96452

197,360
0.76
67748
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Panel B: Market Maker Participation by Year
2004
Price
-0.0013***
(-39.00)
Spread
-1.6791***
(-29.73)
Return Volit
-0.4172***
(-19.42)
Num Trades
-0.0004**
(-2.39)
Num Mkt Makers
0.0028***
(26.65)
Active_Q2
0.0111***
(6.34)
Active_Q3
0.0400***
(19.66)
Active_Q4
0.0770***
(28.70)
Constant
0.8194***
(403.02)
Observations
R-squared
F test

108,133
0.16
2589

2010
-0.0001***
(-3.58)
1.7173***
(34.30)
0.3262***
(16.27)
-0.0006***
(-2.84)
0.0082***
(27.84)
-0.0786***
(-34.00)
-0.1238***
(-47.60)
-0.1166***
(-39.24)
0.2014***
(80.74)
89,227
0.08
1005
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Table V: Number of Market Maker
The table reports the mean number of market makers that participate daily in NASDAQ stocks. All MM is the mean number of market makers per stock that
quote during the trading day. Active MM is the mean number of active market makers per stock that quote during the trading day. We classify a market
maker as active if the market maker quotes at least five times in a trading day. Sample stocks are divided into quartiles based on year and trading activity
with quartile 1 (Q1) consisting of stocks with the lowest number of average daily trades and quartile 4 (Q4) consisting of stocks with the largest number of
average daily trades. Data sources include TAQ, Nastraq, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch for May and June 2004 and 2010. *,**,*** Statistically significant at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
Panel A: Number of NASDAQ Market Makers
2004
2010
Diff [2010-2004]
All MM
35.4
29.5
-5.9***
(-11.1)
Active MM
12.3
7.8
-4.5***
(-21.7)
Panel B: Number of NASDAQ Market Makers by Trading Activity
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
(Least Trades)
(Most Trades)
2004
2010
Diff [10-04] 2004
2010
Diff [10-04]
2004
2010
Diff [10-04]
2004
2010
Diff [10-04]
All MM
17.0
15.4
-1.5***
24.5
23.7
-0.7**
35.3
33.3
-2.0***
64.9
45.3
-19.5***
(-6.2)
(-2.0)
(-4.2)
(-18.6)
Active MM
4.2
3.8
-0.2
7.7
7.0
-0.7***
12.3
8.9
-3.5***
25.3
11.2
-14.2***
(-1.5)
(-7.1)
(-25.8)
(-34.4)
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Table VI: Intraday Market Maker Participation
This table reports intraday variations in standardized bid-ask spreads and the intraday quoting patterns of NASDAQ market
makers at the NBBO. We divide the 6.5 hour trading day (9:30am-4:00pm) into 26, 15-minute segments. Market maker
participation is the percentage of time the NASDAQ market makers quote at either the inside bid or ask price. Standardized
intraday spreads are is computed as (si,t,j-mi,t)/sdi,t where si,t,j is the bid-ask spread from for stock i on day t, in 15 minute intraday
trading segment j, m is the mean spread for the trading day for stock i on day t, and sdi,t is the standard deviation in spreads for
stock i over day t. Data sources include TAQ, Nastraq, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch for May and June 2004 and 2010.
2004
2010
Segment
Standardized Spread
Marker Maker
Standardized Spread
Marker Maker
Participation
Participation
1
2.01
81.9%
2.78
20.5%
2
0.70
82.5%
0.79
20.1%
3
0.40
83.0%
0.48
19.8%
4
0.26
83.1%
0.28
19.8%
5
0.14
83.2%
0.17
22.6%
6
0.08
83.3%
0.09
22.6%
7
0.01
83.4%
0.04
22.2%
8
-0.01
83.6%
-0.02
21.9%
9
-0.03
84.0%
-0.07
22.1%
10
-0.03
83.9%
-0.11
22.3%
11
-0.09
83.9%
-0.13
22.2%
12
-0.10
84.1%
-0.17
22.3%
13
-0.16
84.2%
-0.19
22.0%
14
-0.18
84.1%
-0.21
22.0%
15
-0.21
84.1%
-0.23
23.2%
16
-0.22
84.5%
-0.25
23.2%
17
-0.25
84.6%
-0.27
22.9%
18
-0.24
84.3%
-0.30
23.0%
19
-0.26
84.2%
-0.32
22.0%
20
-0.23
84.3%
-0.33
21.6%
21
-0.26
84.3%
-0.37
21.5%
22
-0.28
84.1%
-0.34
21.3%
23
-0.30
84.3%
-0.37
20.8%
24
-0.34
84.4%
-0.40
20.4%
25
-0.35
84.5%
-0.47
19.6%
26
-0.21
84.2%
-0.58
18.8%

Table VII: Intraday variations in bid-ask spread and Market Maker Participation
This table reports regression analysis for the following two models:

where
is the standardized spread for stock i on day t in segment j.
is a vector of
dummy variables for each of the 26 15-minute segments.
is a vector of market maker
participation variables. Market maker participation is computed as the percentage of time that market
makers are at either the inside bid or ask price for stock i on day t in segment j.
is the standard
deviation of trade-to-trade returns for stock i on day t in segment j.
is the number of trades
which execute for stock i on day t in segment j. For brevity we report only indicator variables for each of the
26 15min intraday segments in Panel A. In panel B we report only PercentInside intraday segment variables.
Data sources include TAQ, Nastraq, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch from May and June 2004 and 2010. We
exclude t-stats for brevity. *,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively

Seg_1
Seg_2
Seg_3
Seg_4
Seg_5
Seg_6
Seg_7
Seg_8
Seg_9
Seg_10
Seg_11
Seg_12
Seg_13
Seg_14
Seg_15
Seg_16
Seg_17
Seg_18
Seg_19
Seg_20
Seg_21
Seg_22
Seg_23
Seg_24
Seg_25
Seg_26

Panel A: Model (3)
2004
1.9813***
0.6460***
0.3128***
0.1664***
0.0260***
-0.0296***
-0.1117***
-0.1258***
-0.1508***
-0.1477***
-0.1980***
-0.2056***
-0.2705***
-0.2848***
-0.3307***
-0.3339***
-0.3657***
-0.3442***
-0.3614***
-0.3095***
-0.3507***
-0.3573***
-0.3849***
-0.4399***
-0.4534***
-0.3127***

2010
2.9436***
0.7498***
0.4415***
0.2265***
0.1321***
0.0518***
0.0039
-0.0570***
-0.1061***
-0.1522***
-0.1632***
-0.2118***
-0.2256***
-0.2409***
-0.2625***
-0.2783***
-0.3001***
-0.3246***
-0.3429***
-0.3535***
-0.3888***
-0.3565***
-0.3896***
-0.4219***
-0.4940***
-0.6034***

Observations
R-squared
F test

1,959,162
0.32
32937

1,682,289
0.52
65674
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Panel B: Model (4)
PercentInside_1
PercentInside_2
PercentInside_3
PercentInside_4
PercentInside_5
PercentInside_6
PercentInside_7
PercentInside_8
PercentInside_9
PercentInside_10
PercentInside_11
PercentInside_12
PercentInside_13
PercentInside_14
PercentInside_15
PercentInside_16
PercentInside_17
PercentInside_18
PercentInside_19
PercentInside_20
PercentInside_21
PercentInside_22
PercentInside_23
PercentInside_24
PercentInside_25
PercentInside_26

2004
-0.1672***
-0.0873***
-0.1767***
-0.1150***
-0.1304***
-0.1268***
-0.1704***
-0.1051***
-0.1323***
-0.1630***
-0.1190***
-0.1118***
-0.1422***
-0.0856***
-0.1009***
-0.1400***
-0.1366***
-0.0919***
-0.0741***
-0.0431***
-0.0795***
-0.0831***
-0.0801***
-0.1395***
-0.1883***
-0.0887***

2010
-0.9451***
-0.1025***
-0.0795***
-0.0238*
-0.0752***
-0.0545***
-0.0193*
-0.0193*
-0.0025
0.0019
0.0086
0.0485***
0.0661***
0.0500***
0.0717***
0.0451***
0.0569***
0.0782***
0.0872***
0.0901***
0.1054***
0.1748***
0.1842***
0.1744***
0.2395***
0.2660***

Observations
R-squared
F test

1,959,162
0.32
17130

1,682,289
0.52
34401
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Figure I: Market Maker Behavior and Stock Trading Activity
This figure plots mean percentage of the trading day that NASDAQ market makers quote at the NBBO across stocks with
different levels of trading activity. We form activity quartiles for both sample periods based on trading activity with Activity Q1
consisting of stocks with the lowest number of average daily trades and Activity Q4 consisting of stocks with the largest number
of average daily trades Sample stocks include all NASDAQ listed firms. Data sources include TAQ, Nastraq, and NASDAQ
TotalView Itch for May and June 2004 and 2010..
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Figure II: Intraday Market Maker Behavior
This figure plots intraday variations in mean standardized bid-ask spread and the standardized intraday quoting behavior of
NASDAQ market makers quotes at the NBBO. Market maker participation is the percentage of time that dealers are at the bid or
ask quote during each 15-minute segment. Standardized intraday spread is computed as (si,t,j-mi,t)/sdi,t where si,t,j is the bid-ask
spread for stock i on day t, in each 15 minute intraday trading segment j, m is the mean spread for the trading day for stock i on
day t, and sdi,t is the standard deviation in spreads for stock i over day t. Market maker participation is standardized in similar
fashion. Sample stocks include all NASDAQ listed firms. Data sources include TAQ, Nastraq, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch for May
and June 2004 and 2010.
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ESSAY 3: Dealers in Times of Distress: The Case of Stub Quoting
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3.1. Introduction
Prior research shows that market makers play an important role in providing
liquidity in times of heightened price volatility and adverse selection (Corwin and Lipson,
2000; Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2004; Barclay, Hendershott, and Jones, 2008, Chung and
Kim, 2009). Findings of these studies suggest that, despite the proliferation of nonintermediated electronic trading venues, market structures with market makers are viable.
The intermediated market structure appears to increase in importance during periods of
elevated uncertainty.
This study contributes by examining the liquidity providing behavior of market
makers around two changes in dealer obligations. For one, we examine the prevalence of
NASDAQ dealer “stub quoting” in the period surrounding the relaxation of NASDAQ trading
rule 4613 in November of 2007, which required NASDAQ market makers to place twosided quotes that must be “reasonably related” to the current best bid and offer. 13 Second,
we examine the quoting behavior of NASDAQ market makers surrounding the SEC ban on
stub quoting in December 2010, which required market makers to quote within 8% of the
national best bid and offer price (NBBO).
Examining the behavior of NASDAQ market makers surrounding these events
provides two natural experiments with which to gain insight in the role NASDAQ dealers
play during times of changing quoting obligations. The first period represents a time of

“Stub quoting” is a practice in which market markers place a bid or offer that is
drastically different that the prevailing price. For example, suppose a stock is trading at
$50, a market maker may place a stub bid at 1 cent or a stub offer at $1000.
13
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diminished obligations of dealers to provide liquidity. In the second period, SEC regulation
extends the obligations of NASDAQ market makers.
We address two issues in this study. We study marker makers liquidity providing
behavior when required to place two-sided quotes at reasonably related prices. We also
explore if the option for market makers to place quotes at prices not reasonably related to
the NBBO changes market maker behavior during volatile periods.
We find evidence in both the 2007 and 2010 rule change periods that placing
restrictions on stub quoting alters market makers’ liquidity providing behaviors. Stub
quoting restrictions increase the time that market makers quote at the NBBO. We also find
evidence that stub quoting restrictions increase the percentage of daily volume which
executes through market makers. However, we find little evidence that stub quoting rules
impact the participation of market makers during days with excessive volatility.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses
background literature and develops hypothesizes. Section 3 describes the data to be used
in the study. Section 4 sets forth our results and Section 5 concludes.

3.2 Background and Hypothesis
2.1 Stub Quotes and NASDAQ
In August 2007 NASDAQ requested permission from the Securities and Exchange
Commission to amend its Rule 4613 to eliminate the requirement that NASDAQ dealer
quotes be “reasonably related to the prevailing market” (Staff, 2007). The rule amendment
permits NASDAQ market makers, who are required to quote both sides of the market, to
“step away” from providing liquidity or post competitive quotes on only one side of the
68

market. The practice of placing a quote far away from prevailing market quotes is termed
stub quoting. At the time of the request, NASDAQ maintained that permitting market
makers to stub quote would not adversely affect market conditions (Staff, 2007).14
In the wake of the May 6, 2010 “flash crash”, in which the Dow Jones Industrial
Average fell 700 points in a few minutes, the practice of stub quoting received renewed
attention. According to the CFTC-SEC Preliminary Report to the Joint Advisory Committee
on Emerging Regulatory Issues, short sales against stub quotes accounted for more than
70% of the busted trades between 2:45pm and 2:50pm, and 90% between 2:50pm and
2:55pm on May 6, 2010. Trades against stub quotes, which were not intended to execute,
became a significant factor in the large price swings that occurred during the crash.
In response to the events of May 6, 2010 the Securities and Exchange Commission
instituted a ban on stub quoting (SEC, 2010B). The new ban became effective on December
6, 2010 and included several provisions. For securities subject to the circuit breaker pilot
program, which includes stocks in the S&P 500, Russell 1000 as well as some other
exchange-traded products, market makers must enter quotes that are no more than 8%
away from the National Market System Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) with the exception of
periods near the open and close of the trading day. During periods near the open and close
of trading, market makers must enter quotes no more than 20% away from the NBBO.
Market makers must post quotes that are no more than 30% away from the NBBO for listed
equities that are not in the circuit breaker pilot program. The rule permits a market
maker's quote to "drift" an additional 1.5% away from the NBBO before a new quote within

14

The official SEC announcement of the 2007 change to NASDAQ trading rule 4613 is included in Appendix I.
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the applicable band (within 8% for pilot stocks and within 30% for non-pilot stocks) must
be entered.15
In the SEC press release 2010-216 SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro stated, of the
ban on stub quoting, “By prohibiting stub quotes, we are reducing the risk that trades will
be executed at irrational prices, and then need to be broken, if the markets become volatile.
While we continue to look at other potential obligations for market participants, this is an
important step in our effort to improve the functioning of the U.S. markets, and restore
investor confidence following the events of May 6” (SEC, 2010B).
Figure I includes outlines of both the 2007 NASDAQ modification to trading rule
4613 and the SEC stub quote rule implementation in 2010. The NASDAQ change to rule
4613 is a reduction in the quoting obligations of market makers, which has the potential to
alter the liquidity market makers provide. The SEC rule enacted in December 2010, which
bans sub quoting is an expansion of market maker quoting obligations and could also
impact the liquidity providing behavior of market makers. We examine the impact the two
rule changes have on the amount of liquidity provided by market makers by testing the
following hypotheses:
H1: The percentage of time that dealer quotes are at the inside spread and the amount
of trading volume executed through market makers decreases in the period after
NASDAQ changed trading rule 4613.
H2: The percentage of time that dealer quotes are at the inside spread and the amount
of trading volume executed through market makers increases in the period after the
SEC imposed restrictions on stub quoting.

15

Appendix II is a copy of the official SEC press release outlining the 2010 stub quoting rule.
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[Insert Figure I Here]

3.2.2 Market maker behavior in times of heightened volatility
A second issue we address in the current study is if the option for market makers to
place quotes at prices not reasonably related to the NBBO changes market maker behavior
during volatile periods. Research shows that designated market makers play an important
role in times of low liquidity, excessive price uncertainty, and adverse selection risk.
Mahhaven and Sofianos (1998) examine the determinants of NYSE specialist trading, and
find that specialists are more likely to trade in times of low activity and when internal and
external competition is low. Their results suggest that the participation of specialists in
trading increases when liquidity is low. Consistent with Mahhaven and Sofianos, Chung,
Van Ness, Van Ness (1999) show that specialists are more likely to provide liquidity when
limit order book spreads are wide.
The behavior of market makers surrounding periods of heightened volatility and
uncertainty is also documented. Corwin and Lipson (2000) study order flow and liquidity
around trading halts on the NYSE, which are triggered in response to large imbalances
between buy and sell orders. The authors find that, prior to halts, the specialist widens or
“spreads the quote” to convey information about the imbalance. They also find that the
specialist and floor traders provide a significant amount of liquidity during these periods of
uncertainty.
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Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) look at the behavior of NYSE traders during a period
of high volatility in October 1997 that triggered a circuit breaker. The authors show that,
during this period of extreme market movement, the cost of providing liquidity via the
electronic limit order book increases and a dramatic amount of liquidity shifts to the floor
of the NYSE. These results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Grossman
(1992) who predicts that markets become increasing valuable in times of heightened
uncertainty. Lyons (2001) shows that foreign exchange traders favor the direct dealer
market over the electronic broker market in times of uncertainty.
There is also evidence that NASDAQ market makers supply liquidity during high
volatility days. Li, McCormick, and Zhao (2005) examine the liquidity providing behavior of
NASDAQ dealers during the 2000 bubble burst of NASDAQ internet stocks. The authors
find that NASDAQ dealers provide liquidity during periods of large price movements and
order imbalances.
Chung and Kim (2009) compare the specialist system of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) to the dealer market structure of NASDAQ to determine which structure
is better suited to provide liquidity in time of heightened volatility. The authors find
evidence that the NYSE specialist system is better able to provide liquidity in times of high
volatility relative to the dealer system of NASDAQ. The authors attribute this finding to the
greater responsibility to provide liquidity placed on the designated market maker of NYSE.
We anticipate that that the diminishing responsibility of NASDAQ market makers, being
allowed to place stub quotes, will further decrease dealers’ incentives to provide liquidity
in time of rapid price movements.
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Given the important role a market maker plays in times of elevated uncertainty, as
documented in the aforementioned literature, we test if rules that alter the obligation of
market makers to quote near the inside spread impacts the amount of liquidity market
makers provide in volatile periods. We propose the following two hypotheses:
H3: The percentage of time that dealer quotes are at the inside spread, and the
amount of trading volume executed through market makers decreases in times of high
volatility in the period after NASDAQ changed trading rule 4613.
H4: The percentage of time that dealer quotes are at the inside spread, and the
amount of trading volume executed through market makers increases in times of high
volatility in the period after the SEC imposed restrictions on stub quoting.
3.3 Data
We use NASDAQ OMX TotalView-Itch data, which includes information about orders
and executions on the NASDAQ system. These data are detailed and include submissions,
cancelations, and executions of displayed orders and non-displayed orders. We use the
market participant identification (MPID) field to uniquely identify market participants. We
then cross-reference MPIDs against a list of NASDAQ market participants to identify orders
submitted by registered market makers.
Because our study focuses on the behavior of NASDAQ dealers, we limit our sample
to stocks listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange. We exclude stocks that have an average
price less than $3. To further minimize data errors we exclude quotes that occur before the
open (9:30am) and after the close (4:00pm), quotes in which the bid price is greater than
the ask price, quotes where the bid or ask price are less than zero, and quotes where the
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bid or ask size is less than or equal to zero. These filters yield a sample size of 2,635 stocks
in the 2007 period and 2,132 in the 2010 period.
We focus on two time periods in our examination of NASDAQ dealers stub quoting
and liquidity providing behavior. The first period is the one month window immediately
surrounding the relaxation of Rule 4613 on November 7, 2007, which requires NASDAQ
market makers to place two-sided quotes “reasonably related” to the current best bid and
offer. The second period comprises the one month period surrounding to the SEC ban on
stub quoting beginning December 6, 2010. A timeline of the two periods examined is
included in figure II.16

[Insert Figure II Here]

Table I displays summary statistics for sample firms. Price is the mean stock price
during the study period. Inside Spread is the average difference between the lowest ask
and the highest bid. P. Spread is the inside spread scaled by the quote midpoint. Bid Depth
(Ask Depth) is the average number of shares quoted at the highest bid (lowest ask). Eff.
Spread is the absolute value of the trade price minus the prevailing midpoint. Return Volit
is the intraday trade-to-trade return standard deviation. Volume is the mean number of
shares executed per day. $Volume is the total market value of shares executed for a sample
firm per trading day. Num. Trades the number of daily transactions for a sample stock.
Table I Panel B reports difference in trading statistics around rule changes for both
the 2007 and 2010 time periods. The columns labeled “Restrict” contain trading and
The primary reason we limit are sample period to one month windows surrounding the effective date of
both rule changes is due to the computational requirement of the NASDAQ OMX TotalView Itch data.
16
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quoting statistics for the periods where stub quoting rules are in effect. In 2007, the
“Restrict” period is the 10 trading days preceding November 7, 2007 before the relaxation
of rule 4613 became effective. The “Restrict” period for 2010 is the 10-trading-days
following the December 6, 2010 enactment of the SEC’s stub quoting rule. The columns
labeled “Un-restrict” report means for the periods where market maker stub-quoting is
permitted. Specifically, the 2007 Un-restrict sample is the 10-trading-day period starting
November 7, 2007. The 2010 Un-restrict period is the 10-trading-days preceding
December 6, 2007.
We compare the changes in trading and quoting variables surrounding rule changes
With the exception of P. Spread all trading and quoting statistics do not change significantly
from the Restrict to Un-Restrict time periods, suggesting that the rules had little effect on
spreads or trading activity. As quoting and trading do not change appreciably, our task of
comparing market maker behavior surrounding these rule changes is more
straightforward and less likely to be driven by exogenous market factors.

[Insert Table I Here]

3.4 Results
3.4.1 Stub Quoting
To identify NASDAQ market maker stub quotes we compare market makers’ quotes
to the prevailing national market system (NMS) highest bid and lowest ask (NBBO) 17 using

17

We use NYSE trade and quote data (TAQ) to compute the NBBO.
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the following method. We identify buy and sell orders submitted by registered market
makers using the NASDAQ TotalView Itch data. Next, we generate an intraday series of
quotes for each market maker using information on market maker order submission,
cancelation, and executions. Then, we compare market makers quotes to the NBBO to
determine the distance between market maker’s quote and the NBBO on both the bid and
ask side. We use the distance from the market maker’s quote to the NBBO to determine if
the quote is a stub quote.
One criticism of NASDAQs restriction on stub quoting prior to November 2007 was
that a stub quote was not well defined. The rule required that market maker post quotes
that are “reasonably related” to the prevailing market. Due to this ambiguity, we use three
separate definitions for a stub quote in the 2007 period. We use the 8% rule as our first
definition of a stub quote. If a market maker quote is between 9:45am and 3:35pm and is
more than 8% percent away from the NBBO then we classify the quote as stub quote. If the
quote occurs near the open or close (before 9:45am and after 3:35pm) then the market
maker’s quote can be up to 20% away from the prevailing inside bid and offer before the
quote is classified stub quote. We use the 8% rule with 20% at the open and close as our
first method of stub quote classification (Stub Quote 8) because this is commonly accepted
definition of a stub quote as defined by the SEC (SEC 2010 B).
We also use a 20% and a 30% rule in the 2007 period to define stub quotes (Stub
Quote 20 and Stub Quote 30 respectively). A quote is classified as Stub Quote 20 (Stub Quote
30) if the distance the maker maker’s quote is from the NBBO is greater than 20% (30%) of
the bid or ask price.

76

We use the definitions of stub quotes as set forth by SEC to identify sub quotes in the
2010 period. The SEC stub quoting rule establishes different requirements for the distance
within which market makers must quote from the NBBO, which vary depending on the
security that the market maker is quoting. Specifically, the SEC defines stub quotes for
securities in the circuit breaker pilot program as market maker quotes submitted between
9:45am and 3:35pm that are more than 8% away from the NBBO. Quotes for stocks in the
pilot program submitted before 9:45am and after 3:35pm are allowed to be 20% away
from the NBBO before being classified as a stub quote.18 Market maker quotes that are
more than 30% away from the inside bid or ask price are classified as stub quotes for
securities not in the circuit breaker pilot program.
We divide the number of stub quotes per day by the total number of market maker
quotes that day to determine the percentage of dealer quotes that are stubbed. Table II
Panel A reports the frequency with which market makers stub quote around the 2007
NASDAQ trading rule change. We report the percentage of market maker quotes that are
stub quotes for the 10-day period prior to the relaxation of trading rule 4613 (“Restrict”)
and the 10-day trading period following (“Un-restrict”). Note that we observe evidence of
stub quoting during the period when stub quoting is prohibited. One likely reason for this
observation is that the language of trading rule 4613 was ambiguous. The rule required
that market makers post quotes that are “reasonably related” to the prevailing market and
did not explicitly define “reasonably related”.

In the aftermath of the May 6, 2010 flash crash, the SEC enacted a stock-by-stock circuit breaker program
that halts trading in specific securities after the stock falls in price by a predetermined amount. During the
months examined in the our study (November and December 2010), securities in the circuit breaker pilot
program include all stock in the S&P 500, Russell 1000, and a list of other exchange traded products (see SEC,
2010A).
18
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In the 2007 sample we observe that 17.5% (13.5%, 12%) of market maker quotes
were Stub Quotes 8 (Stub Quotes 20, Stub Quotes 30) prior to the rule change on November
7, 2007. After the rule change, the rate of dealer stub quotes increases to 21.5% for Stub
Quotes 8, which is a 23% increase. Stub Quotes 20 and Stub Quotes 30 also increase when
the restriction on stub quoting is lifted, rising 4.2% and 4%, respectively. We observe
similar patterns of increasing market maker stub quoting for quotes where only the bid is
stubbed (Stub Bid) or only the ask side of the quote is stubbed (Stub Ask).
We also observe decreases in stub quoting subsequent to the SEC enactment of stub
quoting rules in the 2010 sample. Stub quoting for the all stock sample declines from a prerule rate of 13.7% to a post-rule level of 8.4%, a 38% decline. For stocks in the SEC circuit
breaker pilot program, stub quoting declines from 26% to 10.8%, which is a 58% decline
after the enactment of the rule. For non-pilot stocks, the rate of stub quoting declines to
4.1%, which is a 34% decrease from the period preceding the SEC stub quote rule. Similar
declines are observed in one-sided stub quotes (stubbed only on the bid or ask side) after
the implementation of the SEC stub quoting rules.

[Insert Table II Here]

The level of stub quoting is likely to change based on market and stock
characteristics including the width of the bid-ask spread, risk, activity, and the number of
market makers participating. Spreads are likely to be negatively related to the level of stub
quoting. Chen and Zhao (2004) show that large spreads provide higher potential profits to
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market makers and document an increase in the competitiveness of dealer quotes when
spreads are wider.
We expect that risk will be positively correlated with the level of stub quoting.
Increased uncertainty about a security is likely prompt market makers to step away from
their liquidity providing roles. Chen and Zhao (2004) also document that dealer quotes
become less competitive in periods of heightened volatility. We anticipate increased
trading activity will lead to a decrease in stub quoting. Prior studies show that inventory
and order processing costs are higher for low activity stocks (Stoll, 1978). Hence, dealer
stub quoting is likely to be lower for stocks with higher activity because dealers face less
inventory and order processing costs. Chen and Zhao (2004) observe the percentage of
dealer quotes that are competitive increases with the number of daily transactions.
Additionally, a large number of liquidity demanding trades may increase the NBBO (i.e.
walking up or down the book) and lead to a decrease in the amount of stub quotes.
Market maker quotes become less competitive as the number of market makers
increases (Chen and Zhao, 2004). Therefore, we expect a positive correlation between the
number of market makers and the level of stub quoting. We relate firm characteristics and
quote regulatory environments to stub quoting by estimating the following model:

Where
for stock i on day t.

is the percentage of market maker quotes that are stub quotes
is the mean intraday stock price.
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is the average

difference between the lowest ask and the highest bid for stock i during trading day t.
is the intraday trade-to-trade return standard deviation for stock i on day t.
is included in the regression models as a proxy for risk.

is they

daily number of transactions for sample stock i on day t and is used as a proxy for activity.
is a variable that is equal to 1 for periods that have stub quoting restrictions and
0 when stub quoting is permitted.

is the number of market makers that update

their quotes at least five times in a trading day.
Table III reports the output from the regression analysis. In this regression and all
subsequent regression analyses we include firm fixed effects and report t-statistics based
on cluster corrected standard errors. We observe that price is negatively related to the rate
of stub quoting in both the 2007 and 2010 periods. A $1 increase in stock price decreases
the amount of stub quoting by an average 0.1% in the 2007 period. In 2010, the decrease is
0.2% on average for each $1 stock price increase. The finding that price is negatively
related to the level of stub quoting may be attributable to the increase in the absolute
dollar amount that dealer quotes can be away from the inside spread for stocks with higher
prices.19
Spread is also negatively correlated with the level of stub quoting, suggesting that
market makers decrease the distance their quotes are away from the NBBO as spreads
widen. This finding is consistent with market maker quoting behavior documented by
Chen and Zhao (2004), who show that market makers quote more competitively when

For example, if the inside ask price is $10 and the maximum distance a quote can be away from the NBBO is
8%, then the market maker quote can be no more than $0.80 higher than the inside ask. For a stock with an
ask price of $100 and the same 8% quoting requirement, the market maker can quote up to $8 above the ask
price.
19

80

spreads are wider due to the increase in potential liquidity providing profits with larger
spreads.
With the exception of pilot stocks in the 2010 period, return volatility is positively
related to the level of stub quoting. These positive coefficients suggest that, in times of
heightened price movement, market makers increase the rate at which they remove
themselves from liquidity providing roles. The coefficients of the

dummy

variables are negative. These negative coefficients are consistent with our analysis
reported in table II that stub quoting decreases when rules go into effect restricting the
practice.
The coefficients for the number of market makers in the 2007 period are mixed.
The coefficient on

suggests in the Stub Quotes 8 that additional market makers

increase the rate of stub quoting. The positive coefficient is consistent with the finding of
Chung and Zhao (2004), who show that market maker quotes become less competitive as
the number of market makers increases. The opposite result is observed for Stub Quotes
30. However, the magnitude of each additional market maker decreases the amount of
stub quoting by 0.06% in the case the Stub Quotes 30.
The number of market makers and stub quoting are negatively related for the all
stocks and non-pilot stocks samples in the 2010 period. However, like the 2007 regression,
the magnitude of the coefficient of

in the all stocks regression is relatively small

with each additional market maker decreasing stub quoting by an average of 0.2%.

[Insert Table III Here]
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3.4.2 Market Maker Participation: Test of Hypothesis 1 and 2
A goal of the current study is to examine the liquidity providing behavior NASDAQ
market makers around the rule changes outlined in section 2.1. To this end, after
identifying individual market makers’ quotes for each stock, we identify market marker
quotes with the highest bid and lowest ask to generate an intraday market maker best bid
and offer (mmBBO). We then compare the mmBBO to the NMS highest bid and lowest ask
(NBBO). If the bid or ask price of the mmBBO is equal to the inside bid or ask price of the
NBBO at the same time and for the same stock, we classify the mmBBO to being as At Bid or
At Ask, respectively. We classify the mmBBO as being At Both for periods when the bid and
ask prices of the mmBBO and NBBO are both equal. We also examine the number of shares
at the inside quote for both market makers and other participants in the NMS. The mmBBO
is classified as being Alone Bid (Alone Ask) if market maker quotes make up all shares
available at the NBBO bid (ask) price. Similarly, we indicate the mmBBO is Alone Both if the
mmBBO is equal to the NBBO for both bid and ask prices and quantities. Finally, if neither
the bid or ask prices of the mmBBO is equal to the NBBO, the mmBBO is classified as At
Neither.
We divide the number of seconds during the trading day (9:30am-4:00pm) that
marker makers quote at the inside by the total number of seconds in a trading day to obtain
percentage of the trading day that market makers are At Bid, At Ask, At Both, Alone Bid,
Alone Ask, Alone Both, or At Neither. 20

Note that the mmBBO quote classifications are not mutually exclusive. For example, if the mmBBO and
NBBO ask price and size were both equal to $10 and 200 shares then the mmBBO would be classified as being
both At Ask and Alone Ask.
20
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Table IV reports how often market makers quote at the NBBO around both rule
changes. In 2007, the percentage of time that market makers quote at the inside bid and
offer decrease in the period after trading rule 4613 is altered, removing the requirement
that market makers post quotes that are reasonably close to the prevailing market. The
time market makers quote at the inside bid decreases by 2.1% after stub quotes were
permitted, a 10% decline. The decline is 2.5% for the time market makers quote at the
inside ask price, a 12% reduction. The finding that the percentage of time market makers
spend at the inside quote declines after NASDAQ relaxes trading rule 4613 is consistent
with hypothesis 1, which predicts the percentage of time that dealer quotes are at the
inside spread decreases in the period after the NASDAQ rule change.
In 2010, we observe an increase in the time market makers are at the inside quote
following the SEC implementation of stub quoting rules. For all stocks, we find a 2.1%
(1.7%) increase market maker time At Bid (At Ask), a 12% (12%) increase. Consistent
with the prediction of hypothesis 2, regression results reported in this table suggest that
SEC stub quoting rule increases the percent of time that market makers quote at the inside
bid and offer prices. 21

[Insert Table IV Here]

Studies show that NASDAQ market maker liquidity providing behavior varies
systemically based on market conditions and stock characteristics. Chung and Zhao (2004)

While it is possible that NASDAQ dealers altered their quoting behavior to reflect new rule changes prior to
the effective date of the rule, doing so would bias us away from finding any difference in market maker
behavior surrounding rule changes.
21
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examine cross-sectional variations in NASDAQ market maker inside quoting behavior and
find that dealer quoting patterns are consistent with profit maximizing behavior. Chung
and Zhao show that dealers are more likely to quote at the inside when opportunities for
market making revenues are greater, including when stocks spreads are large, there are
fewer market makers, and there is more frequent trading. Market makers avoid quoting at
the inside when stocks have heightened volatility. We further explore the behavior of
market makers during periods of increased quoting obligations and test hypothesis 1 and 2
by estimating the following models, which control for cross-sectional variations in stock
characteristics shown to impact dealer quoting and trading behavior:

where

i
i

i

is the proportion of time NASDAQ market makers quote at the NBBO.

is the percentage of daily trading volume where NASDAQ market makers are

on at least one side of the trade.

i

i

is the mean intraday stock price.

is the

average distance between lowest ask and the highest bid during the trading day.
is the intraday trade-to-trade return standard deviation.
daily number of transactions for sample stock i in time period t.

is the
is a variable that

is equal to 1 for periods that have stub quoting restrictions and 0 when stub quoting is
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permitted.

is the number of market makers that update their quotes at least

five times in a trading day.

is the percentage of NASDAQ dealer quotes that

are stub quotes for stock i on day t. Due to the different requirements for dealers to quote
near the inside spread around the SEC stub quoting rule implementation in the 2010
period, we estimate regressions models separately for pilot and non-pilot stocks.
Estimation results for market maker participation regressions are reported in table
V. We observe that spread is positively related to the percentage of time market makers
quote at the NBBO and the proportion of volume executed through market makers in the
2007 period. The positive coefficient on Spread suggests that market maker participate
more when spreads are wider. This finding is consistent with that of Chen and Zhao
(2004), who find that dealers quote at the inside when opportunities for market making
revenues are greater, including when stocks spreads are large.
In 2007 we find that volatility is positively correlated with

and

.

The positive coefficient for Volatility in both the time at the inside and percentage of
volume regressions suggests that market makers are more likely to quote at the inside and
execute an increased proportion of volume on days with heightened volatility. This result
is consistent with prior research outlined in section 2.2, that market makers play an
important liquidity providing role during periods of increased uncertainty.
The number of actively participating market makers has a positive correlation with
the time maker makers quote at the inside and the percentage of trading volume market
makers execute. The positive coefficient of

in the

regression likely

reflects that a stock with more dealers making a market, has an increased likelihood that at
least one of them is quoting at the inside bid or offer.
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Our two primary variables of interest in assessing the liquidity providing behavior
of market makers around stub quote rule changes are Stubquote and Restrict. We observe
that the percentage of dealer quotes that are stub quotes decreases both the amount of
time that market makers quote at the inside and the percentage of volume that executes
through market makers. We also observe that market makers quote more at the inside and
execute a higher proportion of share volume during periods of stub quoting restriction.
The coefficient of Restict for the 2007 period suggests that, during the period when stub
quoting is restricted, market makers spend an average of 4%, or roughly 16 minutes more,
of the trading day at the NBBO and execute an average of 1.4%, or 11,304, more shares for
the average sample stock. The findings that the percentage of time market makers spend at
the inside quote and the amount of volume market makers executes declines after NASDAQ
relaxed trading rule 4613 is consistent with hypothesis 1.
Results from the Time At Inside regressions in 2010 period are consistent with the
regression results for the period around the 2007 NASDAQ rule change. The percentage of
dealer quotes that are stub quotes decreases the amount of time that market makers quote
at the NBBO. Also, during the period after the SEC implements stub quoting restrictions,
market makers quote an increasing percentage of time at the inside quote. However, we
find limited evidence that the percentage of trading volume which executes through market
makers is impacted by the SEC’s stub quoting restriction in the 2010 period as the
coefficient for Restrict is not significant. The regression results from the 2010 period
provide only partial support for hypotheses 2. We find support for the hypothesis that the
2010 SEC ban on stub quoting increases the percentage of time market makers quote at the
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NBBO, but do not find evidence to suggest that the percentage of trading volume executed
by market makers increases as a result of the SEC stub quoting rule.

[Insert Table V Here]

3.4.3 Market Maker Participation During Times of High Volatility: Test of Hypothesis 3 and 4
Prior research shows that maker makers play an important liquidity providing role
in times of heightened price volatility as outlined in section 2.2. In this section we test
hypothesis 3 and 4 by analyzing if changes in dealer obligations to quote near the NBBO
alter their behavior during these periods of increased uncertainty.
We first identify days during our two sample periods when volatility is unusually
high. We compute the mean intraday return volatility for each sample stock for rolling
twenty day-windows. We classify a day as having high volatility if it exceeds its previous
20-day average volatility by three standard deviations. This classification procedure yields
1,556 high volatility stock days for the 2007 period and 945 high volatility days for the
2010 sample.
To test if market makers change their liquidity providing behavior, as a results of
stub quoting restrictions during days with high volatility we estimate the following
regression for stocks with at least one high volatility day during the sample period:
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where

is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the trading day for stock i has a

level of price volatility that exceeds its previous 20-day average volatility by three standard
deviations. i
which both i

i
and

i

is an indicator variable equal to one on stock days when
i are equal to 1. Other variables are as previously

defined.
Table VI reports estimation results. We observe a positive relation between days
with high levels of volatility and the percentage of time market makers quote at the
prevailing best bid and offer in the 2007 time period. However, inconsistent with the
prediction of hypotheses 3, we find no evidence that dealer share of volume increases on
days with high levels of volatility or on high volatility days when stub quoting rules are
effective as the coefficients of

is negative.

We also find no evidence to support hypothesis 4 as the coefficients on both
and

are not statistically significant in the 2010 period.

Therefore, we find no evidence to suggest that NASDAQ market makers increase the
amount of time they quote at the NBBO or their percentage of volume during stock days
with high levels of volatility and stub in period with quoting restrictions.

[Insert Table VI Here]
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3.5 Conclusion
We examine the liquidity providing behavior of NASDAQ dealers in the period
around the relaxation of Rule 4613 on November 7, 2007, which required NASDAQ market
makers to place two-sided quotes “reasonably related” to the current best bid and offer.
We also examine the quoting and trading behavior of NASDAQ market makers surrounding
the SEC ban on stub quoting on December 6, 2010, which requires that market makers
quote within 8% of market prices for circuit breaker pilot stocks. Both the NASDAQ
relation of Rule 4613 and the SEC stub quote ban represent changes in the obligations of
market makers. The 2007 NASDAQ rule change is a time of decreasing responsibility for
market makers. The 2010 SEC stub quote ban is a time of increasing obligations. These
events provide two natural experiments with which to gain insight into the impact the
changes in quoting obligations have on the roles of NASDAQ dealers.
We find evidence in both the 2007 and 2010 rule change periods that placing
restrictions on stub quoting alters market makers’ liquidity providing behavior. Stub quote
restrictions increase the time that market makers quote at the NBBO. We find that stub
quoting restrictions increase the percentage of daily volume which market makers execute
in the 2007 period. Yet, we find little evidence that stub quoting rules impact the
participation of market makers during days with excessive volatility.
Taken together, our results suggest that restrictions on stub quoting, which increase
dealers’ obligations to quote near the NBBO, may benefit financial markets in that it
encourages dealers to provide liquidity.
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Table I: Summary Statistics
Price is the mean stock price during the study period. Inside spread is the average distance
between lowest ask and the highest bid. P. spread is the inside spread scaled by the quote
midpoint. Bid Depth is the average number of shares quoted at the highest bid and lowest ask.
Eff. Spread is the absolute value of the trade price minus the prevailing midpoint. Return Volit. is
the intraday trade-to-trade return standard deviation. Volume is the mean number of shares
executed per day. $Volume is the mean total market of shares executed for sample firms per
trading day. Num. Trades the average daily number of transactions for sample stock. Num MM is
the average number of market makers that participate in a stock each day. Restrict is the period
when stub quoting rules are active. Un-restrict are periods when there is no restriction on marker
maker stub quoting. The 2007 sample period is from October 21, 2007 through November 21 (20
trading days). The 2010 period is from November 19, 2010 through December 17, 2010 (20
trading days). Data sources include TAQ, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch.
*,**,*** Indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
Panel A:
2007
2010
Mean
St. Dev
Mean
St. Dev
Price
20.45
23.56
20.20
26.15
Inside Spread
0.1591
0.28
0.1022
0.1831
P. Spread (%)
1.11
1.7
0.93
1.65
Bid Depth (100s)
17
121
48
627
Ask Depth (100s)
16
116
36
328
Eff Spread
0.0742
0.1002
0.0524
0.0882
Return Volit
0.1037
0.1727
0.1087
0.1732
Volume (1000s)
845
5,682
741
3,242
$Volume (1000s)
29,848
302,496
22,010
144,094
Num. Trades
2,985
10,562
2,974
8,706
Num MM
28
13
29
12
N
2635
2132
Panel B:
2007
2010
Restrict Un-restrict Diff (R-UR) Restrict Un-restrict Diff (R-UR)
Price
21.02
19.93
1.09
20.60
19.84
0.75
Inside Spread
0.1564
0.1616
-0.0052
0.0983
0.1062
-0.0079
P. Spread (%)
1.05
1.16
-0.10**
0.88
0.98
-0.10**
Bid Depth (100s)
18
15
3
43
51
-2
Ask Depth (100s)
16
15
1
34
37
-3
Eff Spread
0.0748
0.0735
0.0013
0.0521
0.0528
-0.0007
Return Volit
0.1052
0.1017
0.0034
0.1030
0.1141
-0.0111*
Volume (1000s)
810
883
-73
771
714
57
$Volume (1000s)
28,560
31,222
-2662
22,908
21,203
1,704
Num. Trades
2,862
3,119
-256
3,051
2,914
137
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Table II: Stub Quotes
Table reports percentage of market maker marker quotes that are stub quotes. Stub Quotes 8 is the percentage of market maker quotes that are at
least 8% away from the prevailing NBBO from 9:45am-3:35pm and more than 20% away from the NBBO for the period near the open and close of
trading ( prior to 9:45am and after 3:35pm). Stub Quotes 20 (Stub Quote 30) is the percentage of market maker quotes that are 20% (30%) away
from the prevailing NBBO. Stub Bid 8, 20, and 30 are the percentage of market maker quotes that are “stubbed” on the bid price side of the quote.
Stub Ask 8, 20, and 30 are the percentage of market maker quotes that are “stubbed” on the ask price side of the quote. Stub Quotes in the 2010
time period are defined for pilot stocks as the percentage of market maker quotes that are at least 8% away from the prevailing NBBO from
9:45am-3:35pm and more than 20% away from the NBBO for the period near the open and close of trading (prior to 9:45am and after 3:35pm). For
non-pilot stocks Stub Quotes are the percentage of market maker quotes that are 30% away from the prevailing NBBO. Pilot stocks include stocks in
the S&P 500, Russell 1000, as well as other exchange-traded products (See SEC 2010A). The 2007 sample period is from October 21, 2007 through
November 21 (20 trading days). The 2010 period is from November 19, 2010 through December 17, 2010 (20 trading days). Restrict is a period
when stub quoting rules are active. Un-restrict is a period when there is no restriction on marker maker stub quoting. Data sources include TAQ,
and NASDAQ TotalView Itch.
*,**,*** Indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
Panel A: 2007 NASDAQ Rule
Restrict
Un-restrict
Diff
Stub Quotes 8
17.5%
21.5%
-4.0%***
Stub Quotes 20
13.5%
17.7%
-4.2%***
Stub Quotes 30
12.0%
16.1%
-4.0%***
Stub Bid 8
11.5%
13.9%
-2.4%***
Stub Bid 20
9.5%
12.0%
-2.5%***
Stub Bid 30
12.0%
16.1%
-4.0%***
Stub Ask 8
10.4%
12.6%
-2.2%***
Stub Ask 20
8.0%
10.3%
-2.3%***
Stub Ask 30
10.4%
14.0%
-3.6%***
Panel B: 2010 SEC Rule
All Stocks
Pilot Stocks
Non-Pilot Stocks
Restrict
Un-restrict
Diff
Restrict
Un-restrict
Diff
Restrict
Un-restrict
Diff
Stub Quotes
8.4%
13.7%
-5.2%***
10.8%
26.0%
-15.2%***
8.1%
12.2%
-4.1%***
Stub Bid
4.9%
6.8%
-1.9%***
6.3%
13.1%
-6.8%***
4.8%
6.1%
-1.3%***
Stub Ask
4.5%
8.4%
-3.9%***
5.0%
13.7%
-8.7%***
4.4%
7.8%
-3.4%***

Table III: Determinates Stub Quoting
Where
is one of the following measures of stub quoting: Stub Quotes 8 is the percentage of market maker quotes that are at least 8% away from
the prevailing NBBO from 9:45am-3:35pm and greater than 20% away from the NBBO for the period near the open and close of trading ( prior to 9:45am and
after 3:35pm). Stub Quotes 20 (30) is the percentage of market maker quotes that are 20% (30%) away from the prevailing NBBO. Stub Quotes in the 2010
time period are defined for pilot stocks as the percentage of market maker quotes that are at least 8% away from the prevailing NBBO from 9:45am-3:35pm
and more than 20% away from the NBBO for the period near the open and close of trading ( prior to 9:45am and after 3:35pm). For non-pilot stocks Stub
Quotes are the percentage of market maker quotes that are 30% away from the prevailing NBBO. Pilot stocks include stocks in the S&P 500, Russell 1000 as
well as other exchange-traded products (See SEC 2010A).
is the mean intraday stock price.
is difference between the average distance
between lowest ask and the highest bid during the trading day.
is the intraday trade-to-trade return standard deviation.
is the
daily number of transaction for sample stock.
is an variable that is equal to 1 for periods that have stub quoting restrictions and 0 when stub quoting
is permitted.
is the number of market makers that update their quote at least five times in a trading day. The 2007 sample period is from October
21, 2007 through November 21 (20 trading days). The 2010 period is from November 19, 2010 through December 17, 2010 (20 trading days). T-statistics
based on cluster corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Data sources include TAQ, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch.
*,**,*** Indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
Panel A: 2007 NASDAQ Rule
Stub Quotes 8
Stub Quotes 20
Stub Quotes 30
Price
-0.0013***
-0.0005*
-0.0001
(-3.97)
(-1.68)
(-0.47)
Spread
-0.0464***
-0.0620***
-0.0603***
(-4.86)
(-6.17)
(-6.18)
Volatility
0.1204***
0.1928***
0.1902***
(8.91)
(14.10)
(14.61)
Num. Trades
-0.00000
0.00000
0.0000
(-0.83)
(0.48)
(1.02)
Restrict
-0.0371***
-0.0420***
-0.0410***
(-24.85)
(-29.67)
(-30.75)
Num_MM
0.0029***
0.0002
-0.0006***
(11.85)
(1.09)
(-2.74)
Constant
0.1888***
0.1568***
0.1436***
(25.82)
(25.59)
(27.01)
Observations
54,976
54,976
54,976
R-squared
0.64
0.60
0.58
f test
165.9
191.3
195.9
Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
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This table report results for estimating the following model:

All Stocks
-0.0023***
(-2.64)
-0.0354***
(-3.71)
0.0893***
(9.53)
0.0000
(0.35)
-0.0284***
(-9.67)
-0.0017***
(-10.98)
0.1854***
(10.77)

Pilot
-0.0034***
(2.83)
-0.0609
(-0.40)
-0.5400***
(-3.05)
-0.0000*
(-1.73)
-0.1519***
(-11.19)
-0.0003
(-0.90)
0.1272**
(2.28)

Non-Pilot
-0.0026**
(-2.53)
-0.0355***
(-3.73)
0.0956***
(10.08)
0.0000
(0.02)
-0.0244***
(-8.40)
-0.0011***
(-6.61)
0.1618***
(9.33)

Observations
R-squared
f test

41,113
0.41
110.3

4,558
0.49
51.14

36,555
0.38
72.39

Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Price
Spread
Volatility
Num. Trades
Restrict
Num_MM
Constant
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Table IV: Market Maker Participation
This table reports mean percentage of the trading day that NASDAQ market makers quote at the NBBO. At Bid (At Ask) is the total number of
seconds that at least one market maker quotes at the NMS (National Market System) highest (lowest) bid (ask) price divided by the total number of
seconds in the trading day. At Both is the total number of seconds that NASDAQ market makers quote at both the NMS highest bid and lowest ask
price divided by the total number of seconds in the trading day. Alone Bid (Alone Ask) is the total number of seconds that market makers’ quotes are
the only quotes at the NMS (National Market System) highest (lowest) bid(ask) price divided by the total number of seconds in the trading day.
Alone Both is the total number of seconds that market makers’ quotes are the only quotes at the NMS highest bid and lowest ask price divided by
the total number of seconds in the trading day. Restrict represents a period when stub quoting rules are active. Un-restrict are periods in which
there is no restrictions on marker maker stub quoting. The 2007 sample period is from October 21, 2007 through November 21 (20 trading days).
The 2010 period is from November 19, 2010 through December 17, 2010 (20 trading days. Data sources include TAQ, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch.
*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
Panel A: 2007 NASDAQ Rule
Restrict
Un-restrict
Diff
At Bid (%)
23.4%
21.3%
2.1%***
At Ask (%)
22.7%
20.2%
2.5%***
At Both (%)
5.9%
5.6%
0.3%
Alone Bid (%)
9.7%
8.9%
0.7%**
Alone Ask (%)
8.6%
7.2%
1.4%***
Alone Both (%)
1.9%
1.8%
0.08%
At Neither (%)
59.8%
64.1%
-4.3%***
Panel B: 2010 SEC Rule
All Stocks
Pilot
Non-Pilot
Restrict
Un-restrict
Diff
Restrict
Un-restrict
Diff
Restrict
Un-restrict
Diff
At Bid (%)
17.2%
15.3%
2.1%***
14.0%
12.8%
1.1%
17.6%
15.6%
2.1%***
At Ask (%)
14.7%
13.1%
1.7%***
13.1%
9.1%
4.0%***
14.9%
13.5%
1.4%***
At Both (%)
2.9%
2.6%
0.3%*
0.9%
0.8%
0.1%
3.1%
2.8%
0.3%*
Alone Bid (%)
3.0%
2.8%
0.1%
1.3%
1.5%
-0.1%
3.2%
3.0%
0.2%
Alone Ask (%)
2.7%
2.6%
0.1%
1.2%
0.8%
0.4%**
2.9%
2.8%
0.1%
Alone Both (%)
0.2%
0.2%
0.0%
0.01%
0.00%
0.002%
0.2%
0.2%
0.0%
At Neither (%)
70.9%
74.3%
-3.4%***
73.8%
78.8%
-5.1%
70.6%
73.7%
-3.1%***

Table V: MM Liquidity and Stub Quoting
This table reports regression results examining the impact stub quoting has on market maker participation. Time at Inside is the amount of time NASDAQ
market makers quote at the NBBO. er olumei,t is the percentage of daily trading volume when NASDAQ market makers is on at least one side of the trade.
is the mean intraday stock price.
is the average distance between the lowest ask and the highest bid during trading day t.
is the
intraday trade-to-trade return standard deviation.
is the daily number of transactions for sample stock i.
is an variable that is equal
to 1 for periods that have stub quoting restrictions and 0 when stub quoting is permitted.
is the number of market makers that update their
quotes at least five times on trading day t.
is the percentage of NASDAQ dealer quotes that are stub quotes. Pilot stocks include stocks in the S&P
500, Russell 1000 as well as other exchange-traded products (See SEC 2010A). The 2007 sample period is from October 21, 2007 through November 21 (20
trading days). The 2010 period is from November 19, 2010 through December 17, 2010 (20 trading days). T-statistics based on cluster corrected standard
errors are in parentheses. Data sources include TAQ, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch. *,**,*** Indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively

Price
Spread
Volatility
Num. Trades
Restrict
Num_MM
Stubquote
Constant

Observations
R-squared
f test
Fixed Effects

Time At Inside
0.0020**
(2.17)
0.0461***
(2.95)
0.1663***
(8.40)
-0.0000
(-0.22)
0.0394***
(15.62)
0.0119***
(23.32)
-0.1258***
(-10.06)
0.1816***
(9.21)

Percent Volume
-0.0001
(-0.69)
-0.0016
(-0.18)
0.1712***
(9.35)
-0.0000***
(-4.42)
0.0141***
(15.04)
0.0019***
(13.36)
-0.0127**
(-2.01)
0.0529***
(15.31)

54,976
0.51
153.2
Yes

52,383
0.52
79.85
Yes
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Price
Spread
Volatility
Num. Trades
Restrict
Num_MM
Stubquote
Constant

Observations
R-squared
f test
Fixed Effects

All Stocks
-0.0008
(-0.94)
0.1376***
(5.31)
0.0145
(0.75)
0.0000***
(7.79)
0.0273***
(7.70)
0.0005***
(2.99)
-0.0339***
(-4.16)
0.2461***
(14.19)

Time At Inside
Pilot
-0.0007
(-0.53)
0.8089*
(1.90)
-0.3750
(-1.11)
0.0000***
(5.59)
0.0249**
(2.28)
0.0010***
(2.67)
-0.0293*
(-1.74)
0.1864***
(2.85)

Non-Pilot
-0.0013
(-1.20)
0.1342***
(5.17)
0.0158
(0.82)
0.0000***
(6.02)
0.0293***
(7.72)
0.0002
(1.26)
-0.0333***
(-3.58)
0.2610***
(14.43)

All Stocks
0.0000
(0.247)
-0.0401***
(-3.47)
0.0934***
(7.09)
-0.0000***
(-2.61)
0.0008
(0.86)
0.0001**
(2.55)
0.0035*
(1.81)
0.0274***
(8.44)

Percent Volume
Pilot
0.0002***
(3.25)
0.0210
(1.27)
-0.1812**
(-2.42)
-0.0000**
(-2.32)
-0.0014
(-1.66)
0.0001*
(1.87)
-0.0020
(-1.21)
0.0020
(0.55)

Non-Pilot
-0.0000
(-0.08)
-0.0413***
(-3.54)
0.0958***
(7.23)
-0.0000***
(-3.10)
0.0008
(0.70)
0.0001***
(2.87)
0.0041
(1.68)
0.0313***
(7.89)

41,113
0.51
62.37
Yes

4,558
0.48
17.04
Yes

36,555
0.51
48.65
Yes

35,847
0.44
15.03
Yes

4,476
0.57
5.96
Yes

31,371
0.42
14.72
Yes
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Table VI: MM Liquidity during days with high volatility
This table reports regression results relating the impact of stub quoting on market maker participation. Time at Inside is the proportion of time NASDAQ
market makers quote at the NBBO. er olumei,t is the percentage of daily trading volume where NASDAQ market makers are on at least one side of the trade.
is the mean intraday stock price.
is the average distance between the lowest ask and the highest bid during trading day t.
is the
intraday trade-to-trade return standard deviation.
is the daily number of transactions for sample stock i.
is an variable that is equal
to 1 for periods that have stub quoting restrictions and 0 when stub quoting is permitted.
is the number of market makers that update their
quotes at least five times on trading day t.
is the percentage of NASDAQ dealer quotes that are stub quotes.
is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the trading day for stock i has a level of price volatility that exceeds its previous 20-day average volatility by 3 standard deviations The 2007
sample period is from October 21, 2007 through November 21 (20 trading days). The 2010 period is from November 19, 2010 through December 17, 2010 (20
trading days). T-statistics based on cluster corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Data sources include TAQ, and NASDAQ TotalView Itch. *,**,***
Indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively

Price
Spread
Volatility
Num. Trades
Restrict
Num_MM
Stubquote
HighVolDay
HighVolDay* Restrict
Constant

Observations
R-squared
f test
Fixed Effects

2010 SEC Rule

0.0026**
(2.54)
0.0142
(0.76)
0.1488***
(6.38)
0.0000
(0.23)
0.0350***
(10.84)
0.0116***
(16.15)
-0.1087***
(-6.41)
0.0323***
(3.94)
-0.0331***
(-2.90)
0.1752***
(7.70)

0.0000
(0.26)
-0.0205*
(-1.81)
0.1603***
(6.99)
-0.0000***
(-4.03)
0.0124***
(9.59)
0.0015***
(8.39)
-0.0179**
(-2.28)
0.0026
(0.82)
-0.0017
(-0.43)
0.0572***
(13.25)

Time At Inside
-0.0004
(-0.29)
0.1232***
(3.45)
-0.0251
(-0.84)
0.0000***
(5.36)
-0.0282***
(-5.26)
0.0005**
(2.24)
-0.0232*
(-1.83)
0.0097
(1.34)
0.0075
(0.66)
0.2553***
(9.34)

32,351
0.51
65.06

30,873
0.50
29.58

18,259
0.48
29.91

Yes

Yes

Yes

Percent Volume
-0.0001
(-0.26)
-0.0376***
(-2.80)
0.0707***
(4.14)
-0.0000
(-0.71)
-0.0035***
(-2.68)
0.0000
(0.12)
0.0031
(1.18)
-0.0023
(-1.38)
0.0021
(0.77)
0.0325***
(5.94)
16,260
0.44
5.169
Yes
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2007 NASDAQ Rule
Percent Volume

Time At Inside

Figure I: Summary of Stub Quoting Rules Changes



Rule change removed requirement that market makers
must post quotes that are “reasonably related” to NBBO



Change Proposed August 1,2007



Change effective November 7, 2007



SEC 2010 Stub Quote Rule Change
Securities in circuit breaker pilot program market makers must enter
quotes that are not more than 8% away from the NBBO.



Before 9:45 a.m. and after 3:35 p.m., market makers must enter
quotes no further than 20% away from the NBBO.



Exchange-listed equities not in the circuit breaker pilot program
must enter quotes that are no more than 30% away from the NBBO.



In each of these cases, a market maker's quote will be allowed to
"drift" an additional 1.5% away from the NBBO before a new quote
within the applicable band must be entered.



For NASDAQ stocks SEC rule superseded Rule 4613 Modification
implement in November 2007



NASDAQ subsequently modified rule 4613 to reflect SEC stub quote
rule



Announced November 8, 2010



Rule effective December 6, 2010
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NASDAQ 2007 Stub Quote Rule Change
Modified Rule 4613 to remove requirement governing the
relation of market maker’s quotations to the prevailing
market
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Appendix I: NASDAQ Market Maker Quotations to the Prevailing Market Rule Change
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Release No. 34-56759; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2007-069)
November 7, 2007
Self-Regulatory Organization; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Order Approving Proposed
Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto to Amend Its Rule Governing the Relation of a
NASDAQ Market Maker’s Quotations to the Prevailing Market
On August 1, 2007, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (“NASDAQ”) filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”)1 and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,2 a proposed rule
change to eliminate a requirement governing the relation of NASDAQ market makers’
quotations to the prevailing market. On September 19, 2007, NASDAQ filed Amendment No.
1 to the proposed rule change. The proposed rule change, as amended, was published for
comment in the Federal Register on October 5, 2007.3 The Commission received no
comments regarding the proposal, and is thereby approving the proposed rule change as
modified by Amendment No. 1.
The Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national
securities exchange.4 In particular, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is
consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,5 which requires that the rules of an exchange be
designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national securities system, and, in
general, to protect investors and the public interest.
NASDAQ proposes to amend Rule 4613(c) to eliminate the requirement that a
NASDAQ market maker’s quotations be “reasonably related to the prevailing market.” The
requirement was adopted in 1987, at which time NASDAQ was part of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and operated an over-the-counter market with
competing dealers. NASDAQ states that the requirement is no longer meaningful, given the
regulatory changes, as well as the changes NASDAQ has made to the way its market
operates in the last 20 years. However, for each security in which they are registered,
market makers would continue to be required to be willing to buy and sell the security for
their own account on a continuous basis and at all times maintain a two-sided, attributable
quotation that is displayed in the NASDAQ Quotation Montage. The Commission believes
that the proposal is reasonable in that it mirrors the market maker definition set forth in
Section 3(a)(38) of the Act6 and is consistent with market maker obligations contained in
rules of other national securities exchanges.7 Furthermore, the Commission notes that
NASDAQ has represented that it will carefully monitor the performance of market makers to
determine if the proposal has any impact on the extent to which market makers quote at or
near the inside market.8
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,9 that the
proposed rule change (SR-NASDAQ-2007-069), as modified by Amendment No. 1, be, and it
hereby is, approved.
For the Commission, by the Division of Market Regulation, pursuant to delegated
authority.10
Florence E. Harmon
Deputy Secretary
15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
17 CFR 240.19b-4.
3 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 56586 (October 1, 2007), 72 FR 57085.
4 In approving this proposed rule change, the Commission has considered the proposed
rule’s impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
5 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
6 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(38).
7 See, e.g., NYSE Arca Rule 7.23.
8 In addition, the Commission notes that this rule change does not affect the market maker
exception from the “locate” requirement of Regulation SHO under the Act. Rule
203(b)(2)(iii) of Regulation SHO provides an exception from the “locate” requirement
for short sales executed by market makers, as defined in Section 3(a)(38) of the Act,
but only in connection with bona-fide market making activities.
To qualify for Regulation SHO’s “locate” exception, a broker-dealer must be both a
market maker in the specific security and engaged in bona fide market making at the
time of the short sale for which the broker-dealer is claiming the exception. Thus, a
broker-dealer’s general status as a market maker or its status as a market maker in
the security being sold short does not qualify it for the exception. Further, Regulation
SHO’s “locate” requirement applies on a transaction-by-transaction basis and,
therefore, a market maker must determine whether it is engaged in bona fide
market making for each short sale transaction. See Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 50103 (July 28, 2004), 69 FR 48008 (August 6, 2004).
9 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
10 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
1
2
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Appendix II: Sec Stub Quote Rule
SEC Approves New Rules Prohibiting Market Maker Stub Quotes
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2010-216
Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission approved new
rules proposed by the exchanges and FINRA to strengthen the minimum quoting standards
for market makers and effectively prohibit "stub quotes" in the U.S. equity markets.
A stub quote is an offer to buy or sell a stock at a price so far away from the prevailing
market that it is not intended to be executed, such as an order to buy at a penny or an offer
to sell at $100,000. A market maker may enter stub quotes to nominally comply with its
obligation to maintain a two-sided quotation at those times when it does not wish to actively
provide liquidity. Executions against stub quotes represented a significant proportion of the
trades that were executed at extreme prices on May 6, and subsequently broken.
"By prohibiting stub quotes, we are reducing the risk that trades will be executed at
irrational prices, and then need to be broken, if the markets become volatile," said SEC
Chairman Mary L. Schapiro. "While we continue to look at other potential obligations for
market participants, this is an important step in our effort to improve the functioning of the
U.S. markets, and restore investor confidence following the events of May 6."
The new rules address the problem of stub quotes by requiring market makers in exchangelisted equities to maintain continuous two-sided quotations during regular market hours that
are within a certain percentage band of the national best bid and offer (NBBO). The band
would vary based on different criteria:
For securities subject to the circuit breaker pilot program approved this past
summer, market makers must enter quotes that are not more than 8% away from
the NBBO.
For the periods near the opening and closing where the circuit breakers are not
applicable, that is before 9:45 a.m. and after 3:35 p.m., market makers in these
securities must enter quotes no further than 20% away from the NBBO.
For exchange-listed equities that are not included in the circuit breaker pilot
program, market makers must enter quotes that are no more than 30% away from
the NBBO.
In each of these cases, a market maker's quote will be allowed to "drift" an
additional 1.5% away from the NBBO before a new quote within the applicable band
must be entered.
The new market maker quoting requirements will become effective on Dec. 6, 2010.
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Since May 6, the Commission has taken several steps to reduce the chance that the events
of that day would happen again. Among other things, the Commission:
approved the above-mentioned circuit breaker pilot program, in which trading would
pause if a stock price moved more than 10% in five minutes. That program now
applies to stocks in the S&P 500 or the Russell 1000, as well as certain exchangetraded products.
approved new rules requiring the exchanges to clarify up-front how and when trades
would be broken.
proposed a new rule that would require the self regulatory organizations to establish
a consolidated audit trail system the would enable regulators to track information
related to trading orders received and executed across the securities markets.
adopted rules that would effectively prohibit broker-dealers from providing their
customers with unfiltered access to exchanges and alternative trading systems by
assuring that broker-dealers implement appropriate risk controls.
At Chairman Schapiro's request, Commission staff is continuing to evaluate further
initiatives to address market structure issues revealed by the events of May 6 such as
refining the single stock circuit breakers by incorporating a limit-up/limit-down type
mechanism.
###
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